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Constructing Whiteness: Identity and Imagery in the Legal Battle of   
State of Florida v. Casey Anthony  
  
By: Faraasa Lawrence  
  
I use the articulations of whiteness narrated by the prosecution and defence, in the high-
profile, capital murder trial of Casey Anthony, as the focal point from which to begin my 
analysis, by looking at how both victim and perpetrator statuses were ascribed to (the body 
of) Casey Anthony.  
  
In particular, I use the courtroom constructions of Casey Anthony to examine how 
the defendant was framed through discourses of whiteness and femaleness/femininity. 
These discourses were themselves subject to different interpretations and functions by 
both counsels in the two prominent texts describing the Anthony case: Presumed Guilty – 
Casey Anthony: The Inside Story by Jose Baez and Imperfect Justice: Prosecuting Casey 
Anthony by Jeff Ashton. Through close readings of these texts, which together form the data 
set for this thesis, I assess how one narrative upholds an assumed, hegemonic social norm 
concerning the un-criminalised status of white womanhood, while the other narrative 
serves to destabilise that norm by “trashing” Casey Anthony’s white, feminine identity. 
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I begin this project by briefly reflecting on my own experience to offer a situated, critical 
analysis of American culture and the criminal justice and legal systems in which raced or 
racialised1 and gendered identities are decisive factors in placing and assessing criminal 
accountability, even though these aspects of identity2 are often left unspoken. More 
specifically, I look at what the Casey Anthony case tells us about the interrelated dynamics 
of identity, imagery, and innocence3 in this high-profile capital murder case. I endeavour to 
show that while jurors may not have an explicit preference for acquitting particular bodies, 
they may have instinctive, subliminal, raced, and gendered-based responses that do just 
that. Not only do we lack the ability to challenge our own mental limitations with more 
considered, deliberate, and critical evaluations, but we are reminded with the final verdict 
that a seemingly intangible concept such as “crime” or “criminality” has strong associations 
with certain (racialised) bodies that often exclude white,4 female bodies like Casey 
Anthony’s (Alexander, 2012; Havis, 2013).   
 I was introduced to Casey Anthony’s story during a vacation in Aruba in the summer of  
2011. My grandmother, mother, sister Aqiyla, and I gathered together – three generations 
of racialised women – to watch the trial of a white woman accused of murdering her child. 
                                                             
1 Following Darryl Leroux’s (2011) understanding of racialisation, I consider the definition of being racialised in my own 
assessment of racialised bodies. Racialisation is a social construct, a process of race-making, attributed to different 
populations whereby practices of racism, racial identities, and different groups of people are formulated and constructed as 
“Other.”  
 
2 Identity goes beyond one’s place of residence and citizenship; it involves a way of being, a sense of place and belonging. 
More specifically for Stephanie Shields (2008), identity is the social categories in which “an individual claims membership as 
well as the personal meaning associated with these categories” (p. 301). 
 
3 A verdict of not-guilty does not indicate innocence. It can mean that the prosecution did not prove guilt to the standard 
required by law – beyond a reasonable doubt. In my work, however, I use “innocence” to purport “not-guilty” for simplicity’s 
sake.  
 
4 I use the term “white” to signify the racially dominant group of persons from Anglo-European descent. Being (deemed) 
white, given the advantages, dominance, and privileges that whiteness conveys, is white people’s greatest asset and it is from 





Having been born on the Dutch Caribbean island of Curaçao and having lived in Trinidad 
for a significant period prior to immigrating to New York City many years ago, my 
grandmother, like millions of Americans, became intrigued and alarmed by this case – 
giving up pleasant moments on Aruba’s white sand beaches to secure herself in front of the 
television as she watched the trial unfold. The Casey Anthony trial soon became 
inescapable for us, with many television stations reporting the case live. Witnessing my 
grandmother’s unbending fascination with the case, I knew she only wished that she could 
have been her own jury with the sole power to convict Casey Anthony of murder in the first 
degree. I can clearly recall the witty nature of my mother’s stern response to my 
grandmother’s refusal of beach relaxation; with her distinct Trinidadian accent, my mother 
pleaded: “I did not come all the way to Aruba to watch Casey Anthony; I can watch Casey 
Anthony when I get back to Montréal.” However, as details of the case continued to be 
broadcast, and the scandalous behaviour of Casey Anthony became more publicly dissected 
and scrutinised, my mother, Aqiyla, and I became similarly invested, and alongside my 
grandmother, we watched the case unfold.  
 If Casey Anthony was African-American or Hispanic (a man … and poor), the verdict 
might have reflected an entirely different view. Had Casey Anthony only been a young African-
American woman on welfare, surely we would have asked: “Where’s your baby daddy at?” 
Were she anything but white, no doubt, we would have ghettoised, then convicted, AND then 
executed her. These thoughts, lending themselves to a different conversation altogether, 





reiteration of whiteness5 as a position of cultural privilege within the criminal justice 
system. My family and I reflected on the racialised human experience, always in contrast to 
the white experience, which is (and has been) shaped by racial privilege. I am aware that 
American citizenry is characterised by, and differentiated along, lines of race – whiteness 
and blackness or “Otherness” – and that those who do not occupy a place of white privilege 
are treated as lesser: as without value and integrity. Within this white-black/“Other”6 
paradigm which organises racial discourse, the white identity is constructed and the 
context of whiteness is defined and maintained. This dominant, dualistic paradigm has an 
enormous effect on American discourses on race, criminal justice, law and order, and the 
legal system, reproducing what is perceived to be a white privileged nation – one that 
Casey Anthony clearly embodied. 
 My family and I briefly pondered our place and space in the world during the trial 
of Casey Anthony, and, conversely, our ability to imagine what it means to be racialised 
women and innocent victims in the criminal justice system. The notion of being both 
“racialised” and “innocent” did not fully converge. Innumerable sources continue to argue 
that racialised subjects do not hold the liberty of exercising the same benefits and 
sympathies that are generally given to those who are, simply put, white (Barak, 2004; 
Barak et al., 2010). Though my family and I anticipated a conviction for Casey Anthony, the 
habits and general pattern of American culture concerning white subjects, especially 
                                                             
5 Whiteness refers to what Matt Wray (2006) defines as the psychological and cultural advantages and the economic, social, 
and political privileges of having white or light-coloured skin (p. 5). Whiteness is not merely an identity but more of a practice 
and process, a constantly shifting location that elevates white people (Levine-Rasky, 2002; Wray, 2006). While I do speak of 
“white” and “whiteness” as somewhat separate categories or terms, I must note that the link between the two cannot be 
denied. 
 
6 Only by recognising and addressing the idea of “Otherness” in relation to white bodies can the construction of cultural and 





women of particular family and social backgrounds, reminded us that a guilty verdict in 
this case was not certain. We recognised that social and legal strategies exist that multiply 
the privileges of young, attractive white women in their engagement with the law and the 
judicial courts, particularly in absolving them of criminal responsibility. As we sat together 
in Aruba, a land once colonised by the Dutch, and watched this capital murder trial, we 
continued to witness not only Casey Anthony’s story transpire, but also the inescapable and 
systematic reaffirmation of race and gender privileges within the American criminal justice 
and legal systems.  
As my interest in the Anthony case developed, I was increasingly captivated by the 
way many Americans publicly condemned and convicted Casey Anthony before jurors were 
empowered to officially render a verdict. The freedom the internet gave Americans to voice 
their outrage told me that after watching countless interviews and reading web-based 
blogs, the formal verdict remained (and still remains) incongruent with what many 
members of the public believed (and still believe) to be the “truth.” Though Casey Anthony 
was found not-guilty, she appears to remain guilty in much of the public’s perception. Most 
people responded to the story with anger, and this rage only elevated as the case aged, 
reaching its climax with the verdict. This public uproar is an illustration of the passion that 
erupts when it appears that jurors simply did not “get it right.” 
As a racialised, Canadian woman with strong family ties to the United States, I see 
the historical experiences and injustices suffered by other racialised persons in the United 
States from a unique vantage point. This perspective allows me to develop a critical 
assessment of the ways in which whiteness and femaleness permeated the body of Casey 





guilt. My thesis interrogates constructions of whiteness and white femininity and uses such 
discourses to examine the ways in which Casey Anthony is situated amongst a certain 
demographic: white women (from particular class and social backgrounds) who have, 
historically, enjoyed tremendous privilege within existing social hierarchies, including the 




[2] Introduction  
Thesis Introduction 
This thesis explores white supremacy in a criminal justice context to examine how the 
construction of white femininity as non-violent and non-criminal informs the discourse on 
victimhood – which is inherently raced – and how this construction, intersecting with other 
systems of domination such as age, beauty, and (hetero)sexuality, adds to the complex 
ways in which power and privilege were deployed (in the courtroom) during the trial of 
Casey Anthony. To support this argument, I address how both “whiteness” and “Otherness” 
were conflated, revealed, and communicated within the same individual to either support 
or neglect dominant scripts of white femininity, thereby producing hegemonic ways of 
seeing, consciously and unconsciously. Because criminality and victimhood are contingent 
on and conflated with racial identity, we see in the Anthony case that it became crucial for 
Casey Anthony to remain white, to be identified and seen as white, and to have (access to) 
the advantages and property7 that being white brings with it. 
 My research dissects the multiple and interdependent ways in which whiteness in 
the case of the State of Florida v. Casey Anthony (henceforth: Florida v. Anthony or the 
Anthony case) was constructed, articulated, and put into service by counsels for the 
prosecution and defence. To do this, I studied the two prominent texts written about the 
case: Presumed Guilty – Casey Anthony: The Inside Story by Jose Baez, the defence attorney, 
and Imperfect Justice: Prosecuting Casey Anthony by Jeff Ashton, the prosecuting lawyer. My 
analysis of these narratives in relation to Casey Anthony’s social location was framed by an 
                                                             
7 Property, in this context, goes beyond its popular usage. Here, the term means intangibility: liberties, privileges, advantages, 
opportunities and the like. Property is a right, not a thing – metaphysical not physical (Harris, 1993, p. 1725). According to 
Steve Garner (2007), such rights and expectations are based on membership to the white race, and access to resources and 






examination of how intersecting discourses of race and gender operated within an 
overarching logistics of whiteness.  
 I have used this thesis as a canvas to deconstruct white supremacist discourse and 
complicate whiteness by tracing the various ways that legal counsel constructed Casey 
Anthony through inter-connected and, oftentimes, overlapping raced and gendered 
discourses. Moreover, I examine systems of privilege by demonstrating how whiteness and 
power were mobilised across multiple discursive channels throughout this case. To do this, 
I address the effects of a hierarchically-structured American society that orders race and 
gender, and how such hierarchies are integral to ways in which constructions of whiteness 
and femaleness are received in American society. Through this analysis, I reveal how 
prevailing ideas about womanhood and the mainstream myths of whiteness are used to 
frame particular ideologies and epistemologies about white women. 
This research argues that raced and gendered discourses most often reaffirm 
existing understandings of identity rooted in white supremacy and retrace existing ways in 
which we label particular bodies as either “criminal” or “victim.” These bodies and the 
meanings that adhere to them are then used as legal evidence to corroborate and sustain 
legal narratives. An examination of American criminal law’s “rootedness in structures of 
privilege” (Byers, 2010a, p. 44) allows me to ask: how were notions of whiteness (and 
white femininity) mobilised in the books published by prosecuting and defence counsels 








Emergence of the Anthony Case & Trial 
Casey Anthony’s story gained notoriety in 2008 with the disappearance and death of her 
daughter. Although an enormous amount of material has been devoted to the case and trial 
of Casey Anthony, the following synopsis of the Anthony case was developed largely from 
information gathered through Biography, CNN, and USA Today.  
 
Casey Anthony: The Early Years & Background to the Trial 
Born on March 19, 1986, in Warren, Ohio, Casey Anthony8 was a bright and personable 
young girl. When Casey was three years old, she relocated to Hopespring Drive in Orlando, 
Florida with her parents, George and Cynthia (“Cindy”), and her older brother, Lee 
Anthony. On August 9, 2005, when Casey was 19 years old, she gave birth to her daughter, 
Caylee Anthony, in Orlando. She and Caylee lived in the Anthony home where Cindy, a 
practicing nurse, became Caylee’s primary caregiver. 
 Casey was known to fabricate stories. Her friends stated that Casey’s interest in 
telling lies emerged when she was in high school. When she was nineteen, Casey put on 
weight and her parents suspected she was pregnant. Casey denied it, convincing them that 
she had not engaged in sexual intercourse and, therefore, could not be with child. Seven 
months into her pregnancy, she finally confided in her parents. However, the identity of the 
baby's father remained (and continues to be) a mystery. Casey pointed to various men as 
the baby’s father, and she also claimed several times that her daughter was conceived after 
she was drugged and raped at a party. However, these allegations could not withstand 
serious criticisms by the media and the prosecution (Casey Anthony Biography, 2014). 
                                                             





 In another reported incident of deception, Casey claimed she was working at 
Universal Studios, a local theme park, as an event planner; investigators later discovered 
this was a lie. During the two years before “the Anthony case” became a nation-wide 
sensation, Casey left the family home every morning as if she was employed. Although 
nobody has ever discovered exactly what Casey did to occupy her time each day while she 
was away from the home, the evidence suggests that she enjoyed a full social life. After 
Cindy saw a photo online of Casey at a party in mid-June 2008, she accused Casey of being 
an unfit mother and threatened to get custody of Caylee. The following day, Casey left her 
parents’ home, supposedly taking Caylee with her. Reportedly, this was the last day Caylee 
was seen.  
 
The Anthony Saga: The Case & Investigation 
On June 16, 2008, when Caylee was almost three years old, Casey, then twenty-two, was 
reported to have left the family home with Caylee to visit the child’s nanny, twenty-five-
year-old Zenaida Fernandez-Gonzalez (referred to as “Zanny” throughout the case). When 
questioned, both Cindy and George Anthony confirmed that their daughter had informed 
them that she was bringing Caylee to be cared for by Zanny. During the initial interrogation, 
Casey mentioned she had tried to phone Zanny, but the phone was turned off and later 
disconnected. That same afternoon, Casey was captured on video surveillance at a 
Blockbuster store renting a movie with her boyfriend, Anthony “Tony” Lazzaro, whom she 
had met on Facebook; they later spent the evening together at his home. Telephone records 
confirm that Casey spent the next several days at Lazzaro’s apartment. On June 27, Casey 





was not entirely forthcoming with information, her reasons for disposing of her vehicle 
were unclear.  
 For the next thirty-one days, nobody heard from or saw Caylee. Several reports 
from counsels mentioned that Cindy frequently asked Casey about Caylee, urging and 
pleading to be allowed to see her granddaughter. Despite the repeated requests, Casey was 
resistant and refused to allow any interaction between her mother and daughter. Supplying 
vague excuses, Casey noted that she was too busy to see or talk with her parents each time 
they telephoned her. Throughout this time, she also claimed that her daughter was being 
properly cared for by Zanny to reassure her parents that they had nothing to worry about. 
Her parents were patient for the most part, hoping their granddaughter would soon be 
brought home. During this time, Casey forged multiple cheques from her friend Amy 
Huizenga’s bank account. This would be an important element in Casey’s multiple arrests.  
 On July 13, George, a former law enforcement officer, noticed a certified letter from 
Johnson’s Wrecker Service attached to his front door, informing Cindy and him that Casey's 
car was in a tow yard. At the lot, George told the tow yard employee that he feared Caylee 
was dead inside the trunk, as he and Cindy had not seen her in over a month. His fears 
seemed to be acknowledged by an offensive and pungent odour emanating from the trunk 
of the car, a smell later described as that of organic matter decomposing (i.e., a dead body). 
However, evidence later suggested that the smell might have come from a large white 
kitchen bag of garbage found in the trunk of the car, decomposing in the Florida heat.  
 With help from Huizenga, Cindy tracked down Casey at Lazarro’s apartment on July 





that Casey had stolen a vehicle.9 Confusing as this account may seem, Cindy’s rationale for 
contacting law enforcement about a “stolen” car was a ploy to get through to Casey “that 
she meant business,” in the hopes of obtaining information about Caylee’s whereabouts. 
Casey spoke to an operator and admitted that she had not seen Caylee for more than thirty 
days. Later that afternoon, Casey broke down, telling her mother and Lee that she had left 
Caylee with Zanny in Orlando on June 16, and that the nanny had kidnapped her daughter 
(Baez, 2013, p. 9). After Casey’s admission, Cindy contacted the Orange County Sheriff's 
Office once again, this time to file a missing child’s report. Casey’s friends and family had 
never heard of Zanny, and detectives later discovered that there was, in fact, no nanny.  
 After a fruitless search and multiple interviews with family and friends, the 
investigators came to believe that Caylee had been a victim of a homicide – a crime 
committed by Casey. Casey was arrested on July 16, 2008 for suspicion of child neglect, 
providing false official statements, and obstruction of an investigation. On July 17, an air 
sample was taken from the trunk of Casey’s car, and a cadaver dog picked up the scent of 
decomposition. Law enforcement officers also found hair, a stain (the origin of the stain 
was not confirmed), and a bit of dirt in the trunk. As the search for Caylee intensified, Casey 
came under increasing scrutiny by the press for her actions in the days prior to Caylee 
being reported missing, including partying and getting an “irreversible” tattoo that read 
Bella Vita – “beautiful life” – in Italian (Ashton, 2012, p. 280). These actions were 
interpreted as signs of her guilt, with the tattoo seeming to indicate that she felt she could 
now live the “beautiful life” unattached her child. Many of the sources discussing the case in 
                                                             





the media reported that Casey was widely viewed as narcissistic and promiscuous, fuelling 
the fires of public sentiment against her.  
 A grand jury convened on October 14 and Casey was indicted on capital murder 
charges and taken into custody. While Casey was in jail awaiting trial, Caylee’s bodily 
remains were located on December 11 by Roy Kronk, a meter reader, in a forested area 
approximately a mile from the family residence. Duct tape was discovered covering the 
mouth of the skull, and the case was immediately ruled a homicide. However, the cause of 
death could not be determined due to the amount of time the body had remained in the 
area undetected and the resulting decomposition of the remains. Nevertheless, Casey was 
indicted on charges of first-degree murder, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child 
neglect, and four counts of providing false information to the police. In April 2009, the 
prosecutorial team stated that they would seek the death penalty against Casey.  
 
Florida v. Anthony: The Trial & Infamous Verdict 
Many newspaper, radio, and television programs like Geraldo Rivera, True TV, and Nancy 
Grace, as well as various social media sites, followed this case. It was the topic of the day, 
especially in the United States, almost every day from 2008 to 2011. The case was 
described as the “trial of the century” by several social media sites. One major cause of the 
worldwide media attention was the fact that Caylee had been missing for thirty-one days 
before a police report was filed, but another common thread in the public’s fury was that 
Casey was a failed mother and possibly a murderer. At one point, the media reported that 
Casey was “the most hated person in America.” Because of the case’s popularity, it would 





about the case in the county of Orlando, making a fair trial unattainable. For this reason, the 
judge and lawyers for both counsels travelled to Pinellas County, Florida to attempt to pick 
an unbiased jury from a population that would be less tainted by the pre-trial publicity and 
media coverage. On May 9, 2011, jury selection began. A jury of ten whites and two blacks, 
seven women and five men, was sworn in after the two-week selection process; they were 
transported from Pinellas County to Orlando at taxpayers’ expense and were sequestered 
inside a hotel for the duration of the trial. 
 On May 24, three years after the mysterious disappearance of Caylee, the televised 
capital murder trial of Florida v. Anthony began with opening statements from counsels for 
the prosecution and defence. Cable news channels aired the trial live; Americans were 
captivated by “Tot Mom,” as Nancy Grace coldly put it, or “Baby Killer” as the protesters 
labeled her (Bello & Welch, 2011). The burden of proof rested with the prosecution team to 
prove their theory that Casey suffocated Caylee by placing duct tape over the child’s mouth 
and nose and wrapping her in a Winnie the Pooh blanket. Furthermore, prosecutors argued 
that Casey placed Caylee’s body inside two laundry bags, kept her inside the trunk of her 
car, and later discarded her in the wooded area near the family home. This circumstantial 
case hinged heavily on Casey’s behaviour during the thirty-one days her daughter was 
missing. The prosecution argued that Casey was a callous liar who murdered her daughter 
to remove herself from the responsibilities of motherhood and lead a carefree life. They 
also presented evidence, such as internet searches for the toxic chemical “chloroform” on 
the Anthony’s home computer, to confirm that the crime was premeditated (Casey Anthony 





 Counsel for the defence iterated a different narrative with the aim of creating 
reasonable doubt. Casey’s attorneys claimed that Caylee had accidentally drowned in the 
family pool and that George covered up the death so that Casey would not be charged with 
child neglect.10 Additionally, defence counsel argued that due to a history of family 
dysfunction,11 Casey grew up learning to lie (i.e., cover up secrets) and to live in denial. The 
defence claimed that Casey was terrified of her father and, consequently, did not report him 
covering up the accidental death or even her own alleged sexual abuse. George denied both 
accusations12 that were made against him; meanwhile, Casey did not testify during the trial 
because the defence decided it might be too risky during cross-examination. On June 30, 
the defence rested their case by informing jurors that no one, including the prosecution, 
would ever be able to answer how Caylee died because the evidence the prosecution had 
presented could not confirm Casey’s involvement in the death of her daughter.  
 As Florida v. Anthony unfolded, many believed Casey was guilty; however, the jury 
evidently had a different opinion. Legal analysts and court watchers suggested that, despite 
the seemingly endless sensationalism surrounding the investigation and trial, the 
prosecution's case simply did not prove Casey’s guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” because 
no forensic evidence – DNA or fingerprints – directly linked Casey to her daughter’s death. 
With nearly one hundred different witnesses and a few hundred pieces of evidence 
presented during trial, the entire case took roughly one month to be heard and only half a 
day for a verdict to be rendered. To be more accurate, ten of the twelve jurors rendered a 
                                                             
10 Defence counsel argued that George disposed of Caylee’s body in the wooded area near the family home.  
 
11 It was alleged that Casey had been sexually abused by George since she was eight years old, and that her brother Lee had 
made sexual advances towards her. This was never confirmed. The possibility that George may be the father of Caylee was 
considered; a DNA test quickly ruled this out.  
 





verdict within ninety minutes of deliberation; the remaining hours were spent convincing 
the two “holdout” jurors to acquit the defendant (Ashton, 2012, p. 318).  
Hundreds of people gathered in front of the courtroom for the verdict. Many court 
watchers were expecting Casey to be convicted of murder and were stunned by the verdict 
rendered by the jury. Still loathed by the American public, with some comparing the 
surprising verdict to that of the O.J. Simpson case (Bello & Welch, 2011), Casey Anthony 
was found “not-guilty” for the murder of her daughter, Caylee Anthony, on July 5, 2011, in 
the Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, in and for the state of Florida.  
Overview of Chapters 
 This thesis is organised into nine chapters, each of which addresses a compelling area of 
discussion, research, and/or analysis of the raced and gendered underpinnings of the 
Anthony case. In chapter three I begin with a review of major scholarship on 
criminalisation, race, racism, and the legal system to situate my own work within existing 
research. I synopsise the literature on the adversarial trial system in the United States by 
challenging and making observations on the more orthodox approaches to law. 
Subsequently, I discuss the discourses surrounding the white trash narrative, using my 
research to examine how this narrative works to identify, catalogue, and marginalise 
“different” white individuals.  
 The theoretical framework that guides my research is explored in chapter four. I 
employ a critical discussion of theories in critical race and intersectionality, alongside a 
discussion of white supremacy and white privilege – which uses an interlocking 





ways as a theoretical frame, the white trash narrative is further examined to help me put 
the prosecutorial narrative into perspective for closer analysis.  
Following a theoretical discussion to establish the premise for my analysis of Casey 
Anthony, chapter five explains the research methodologies and methods employed in this 
study. My data-collection section describes the research process to highlight how each step 
in the process contributed to my critical discursive understanding of the Anthony case, the 
reasons for choosing my data set, and how I organised my data.  
 Chapter six, “Contradicting Discourse: Whiteness,” (re)positions whiteness within 
particular spaces of privilege. The task in this section is to trace how the narratives for 
prosecuting and defence counsels are linked to discourses of whiteness. Moreover, by 
discoursing whiteness, I complicate notions of race by demonstrating how whiteness is a 
socially constructed variable. I argue that counsels’ constructions build two distinct stories 
of the defendant: one in which Casey Anthony’s ownership to whiteness is reinforced and 
reproduced, and another in which her alleged claim to whiteness is undermined or 
altogether neglected.  
In the next chapter, “Contradicting Discourse: Femaleness,” I examine the discourse 
on hegemonic femininity and its subscription to dominant gendered ideologies. By 
acknowledging that gender is a construct that operates with(in) discourses of race and 
privilege, I contend that the construction of the white woman casted as “victim” pervasively 
intersects with notions of patriarchy, (hetero)sexuality, and white supremacy. 
In chapter eight, “The Un-criminalisation of White Womanhood,” I argue that Casey 
Anthony’s non-criminal identity is shaped around hegemonic definitions and illustrations 





privileges. I further contend that truly understanding this case requires addressing and 
examining systems of white domination, and how racism and sexism have functioned 
symbiotically to create the context in which Casey Anthony’s “innocence” can be explained. 
Suitable directions for future research are also highlighted. 
I conclude this research with a postscript that explores “Researcher Situatedness.” I 
discuss the category of race as a lived, dynamic identity that, in many cases, requires 
constant performance, and I address my concerns with discoursing race as a racialised 
woman. Finally, I pay acclamation to the scholars who have advanced my knowledge of 
whiteness in support of hegemony so that I can offer my own robust and sophisticated 




 [3] Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature on the legal processes of the adversarial criminal trial. I 
devote a section to a review of scholars whose writings focus primarily on white trash 
culture to help address the roots of white supremacy and the racial politics that (re)shape 
and destabilise the status of whiteness. 
The American Criminal Trial and the Mythological “Rule of the Law” 
I engage with different literatures that address and focus on the law; in particular, I discuss 
two sets of scholarship that “imagine” the law quite differently. For more traditional 
approaches to the law, the criminological literature appears to accept the “myths” the law 
tells about itself: the court decides matters of “fact,” the law is just, not embedded in 
systems of oppression, and determined by persons who are fair, justice is blind, the law 
proves guilt and innocence, conclusions are based “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and we are 
all accorded equality before the law “with no privileged or subordinated castes” (Kennedy, 
1997, p. 136). Critical socio-legal scholarship, in contrast, calls out the law by arguing these 
myths root the law in the maintenance of systems of privilege and oppression so that we 
come to understand the law, like most things, as not an absolute “truth” and that there is no 
“law” outside the stories we tell about the law.  
Writing from a more traditional lens, Cotton (1955) argues that the legal process is 
a performance that depends wholly on the mechanics of the prosecution and defence’s 
presentation and is “designed to extract a story about an event that took place in a previous 
time and space” (p. 4). The practice of telling “two sides to every story” is reflective of the 
American adversarial prosecution-versus-defence legal framework. In Goodpaster’s (1987) 





American trial system is that, in matters relating to human conduct, it is the “best truth-
finding system we can devise” assuming that the “principal issue of an adversary trial is to 
discover ‘what happened,’ … and that a competitive contest over what happened is the best 
way to accomplish this goal” (p. 122).  
As Rapping (2003) claims in her research on the politics of representation, the 
courtroom is a dramatic arena in which the questions asked and answered give very 
particular “spins” to those whose voices are represented, and those whose voices are 
marginalised or silenced (p. 159). The power exercised in the courtroom is governed by the 
way stories told by lawyers are transmitted through normative discourses rooted in 
particular “truths.” The stories, argues Riessman (1993), are constructed, “creatively 
authored, rhetorical, replete with assumptions, and interpretive” so that they correspond 
to a specific way of telling truth (p. 4–5). Moreover, in analysing high-profile crime cases, 
Chancer (2005) explains that in the interest of discovery, “the side of the defence is divided 
from that of the prosecution” (p. 116). Chancer (2005) writes that “evidence starts to be 
amassed, and merits/demerits to accrue” on either side (p. 116). “‘Facts’ are ‘proven’ 
dialectically through a complex process of persuasion,” explains Goodpaster (1987); this 
generally takes the form of a “dramatic contest aimed at shaping two mutually inconsistent 
interpretations of common data” (p. 119).  
 Cotton (1995) describes how counsels attempt to construct competing perspectives 
of the defendant to persuade (or manipulate) jurors, judges, and, less directly, the general 
public to accept their constructions (p. 3). Similarly, Chancer (1998) outlines how all high-
profile trials are “structured around the taking of antagonistic sides” (p. 101–02). The trial, 





and the other must “lose” as “verdicts of guilt or innocence are routinely expected” (p. 102). 
Since public attention and interest is focused not only on the crime, but also on the trial 
itself, perceptions are structured around this antagonistic “either/or” outcome and justified 
given the rules of the game by which these cultural institutions operate (Chancer, 1998, p. 
106).  
Critical race scholarship denounces the supposed “truths” and “facts” of the current 
legal system – such as the law is a contest of equal adversaries. Nunn (2000) is one scholar 
who criticises the law as a Eurocentric enterprising system. He explains that the law 
creates “a particular type of culture” which is seen as the “driving force behind racism, 
colonialism, and group-based oppression” (p. 429). Therefore, the legal system, more than 
a simple “battle” between counsels, is designed to criminalise those who do not fit 
particular cultural standards. A contrasting African-centered perspective reveals the 
intrinsic, “hidden relationship between white supremacy and law in the Western cultural 
context” (429–30). In light of critical race theory, Nunn’s work illustrates three concrete 
ways in which law contributes to Eurocentric hegemony: 
First, law ‘controls the beast,’ by organising and directing white institutions and 
cultural practices. Second, law ‘polices’ white culture. That is, it operates to help 
determine which ideas and practices are valued in that culture and which can be 
identified as threats subject to the use of coercion or force. Third, law works to 
legitimate white institutions and practices by helping to place the imprimatur of 
universality on European practices and champion the desirability and inevitability 
of white dominance. (p. 432) 
 
By analysing the Eurocentric approach, Nunn demonstrates that when the white majority 
in the United States wants to “ostracize, control, or mistreat a group of people perceived as 
different”, laws are passed to make the act “legal” – i.e., an immigration law, a zoning law, or 





ensures that “the world is structured and organized according to Eurocentric principles” (p. 
433). In the same breath, Nunn (2000) argues that Euro-centricity is ingrained throughout 
the law, spreading white ideology in order to organise and maintain white society and 
white privilege. Visano (2002) buttresses this point nicely by writing that the law “allows 
particular understandings of whiteness to materialize” so that we can appreciate that the 
law is used, negotiated, and enacted in cultural form (p. 211).  
Alexander’s (2012) “The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness” offers one example of critical race scholarship that looks at the inherent 
“biases” and “privileges” within the legal system while arguing that the system “bears little 
resemblance to what happens on television or in movies” (p. 59). The rules of the law 
concerning “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” “probable cause,” or “reasonable suspicion” 
can readily be located in court cases and textbooks but are much harder to find in real life 
(p. 60). Alexander writes that America is still not an egalitarian democracy, and the 
judiciary courts and legal system remain true to this testament. In fact, Alexander argues 
that mass incarceration illustrates how laws, policies, customs, and institutions are “tightly 
networked … to ensure the subordinate status of a group defined largely by race” (p. 13). 
Furthermore, many racialised defendants in the United States are denied meaningful legal 
representation, argues Alexander, making it incredibly difficult to access quality attorneys 
willing to effectively advocate on the defendant’s behalf.   
 While nobody could say with certainty who the defendant is or what the truth 
actually is, Cotton (1995) argues that we can infer from the verdict which argument or 
“truth” the jury believed to be more deserving of acceptance and credibility (p. 5). In short, 





the day of the crime, while counsel for the defence focuses on who the defendant is, and 
why the defendant’s criminality developed. Such competing images of the defendant weigh 
heavily on the outcome of the verdict and highlight how decisions are made about people 
who stand trial in the criminal justice system (Cotton, 1955; Kaplan, 2012). However, 
according to Davis (2000), this purported “truth” about defendants and the notion of 
reasonability which determines the guilt or innocence of a defendant means “one thing for 
white defendants and another for blacks” (p. 147). In other words, black people cannot and 
should not expect impartial consideration before the courts for, as Haney-Lopez (2000) 
asserts, “no body of law exists untainted by the powerful astringent of race in our society” 
(p. 164). So while the images produced of a white defendant can say something about what 
he or she did and why an event possibly took place, a black defendant would also have his 
or her race to answer for (in addition to the crime committed).  
The importance of the jury in the justice process is linked to a conception of the 
criminal trial as a “dispute between the individual and the state” demanding that those who 
“arbitrate between the disputants are entirely unconnected with the state” (Jackson & 
Doran, 1997, p. 760). With that in mind, the modern jury, argues Langbein (1978), is 
impanelled for a single case; the prosecution and defense play an active hand in winnowing 
prospective jurors through the use of challenges on voir dire13 (p. 272). In reality, however, 
attorneys are not seeking unbiased, neutral jurors. Both counsels have adversarial reasons 
for excluding jurors. Counsels for the prosecution and defence are permitted to “strike” 
people they believe will not respond favourably to the evidence or witnesses they intend to 
                                                             
13 Essentially meaning “to tell the truth.” Voir dire is a scientific process of jury selection whereby questions are used to elicit 
responses from prospective jurors about their background to help counsel determine if they are biased to the case or the 






present at trial (Alexander, 2012, p. 121). Therefore, counsels are seeking those who will be 
sympathetic to their point of view – this makes the ideal of recruiting jurors from all walks 
of life (and races) unachievable. Abramson (1994), like many critical legal scholars 
studying the American criminal law, writes of the inherent “views and biases” built into the 
race, religion, age, and gender of potential jurors (p. 143). This means that seeking jurors 
sympathetic to each counsel’s point of view oftentimes correspond with the already-
embedded biases within each juror so that these preconceptions weigh more on the overall 
case than the evidence itself (p. 143). 
As Alexander (2012) explains, until 1860 no black person had ever sat on a jury in 
the United States. Following the Reconstruction era, blacks began to serve as jurors in the 
South for the first time; however, this progression was not fully realised. Soon blacks began 
to be stripped of their right to vote and their right to serve on juries by the Democratic 
conservatives who “sought to ‘redeem’ the South” (Alexander, 2012, p. 121). For years 
thereafter, the Supreme Court increasingly upheld systematic convictions of black 
defendants by all-white juries in situations where exclusion of black jurors was blatant. 
Prior to the 1985 legal ruling in Batson v. United States,14 prosecutors were able to strike 
blacks from serving on the jury, “provided they did not always strike black jurors” 
(Alexander, 2012, p. 119). The jury system and the rules governing jury selection is yet 
another powerful illustration of the complete abdication of the judiciary courts to 
guarantee racial minorities in the United States equal treatment under the law (Alexander, 
2012, p. 118). In theory, peremptory strikes may seem to promote fairness by eliminating 
                                                             
14 The Court holds that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from using its peremptory challenges to exclude 






jurors who could be “biased”; in practice, however, peremptory challenges are “notoriously 
discriminatory,” explains Alexander (2012, p. 118). Alexander writes that “lawyers 
typically have little information about potential jurors, so their decisions to strike 
individual jurors tend to be based on nothing more than stereotypes, prejudices, and 
hunches” (p. 118). And, in many cases, that means ending up with a jury that is all white or 
almost all white. In other words, excluding all blacks or excluding almost all blacks. 
Attorneys invite jurors to make what Kaplan (2012) calls a “zero-sum decision” 
about the defendant, “forcing them to take sides in the culture war over whether people’s 
behaviour can be explained entirely by their will or partially by the influence of social 
forces” (p. 95). In Cotton’s (1995) analysis of jury deliberations, he argues that since 
potential jurors are not offered classes in the legal process, decision-making is typically 
based on common-sense logic. The narratives discussed throughout the trial and the 
images constructed of the defendant are meant to appeal to the common sense of the jurors 
“or at least to what they already know about human beings and their behaviour” (p. 153). 
However, the common-sense logic that Cotton indicates advances the law in a different way 
since blacks do not figure in legal discourse as part of the collective “we” that often comes 
to mind when we determine common-sense logic (Butler, 2000, p. 147): how people govern 
themselves in and around the world, and how people relate to one another. 
 Trash-Talk: White Trash Culture 
In his book chapter “Behind Blue Eyes: Whiteness and Contemporary U.S. Racial Politics,” 
Winant (1997) states that since different groups of white individuals fit into different 
places in the United States’ racial order, the meaning of whiteness is problematic. 





division in their raced identities, but also whites. As a result, white people are not exempt 
from, nor invulnerable to, subjugation and discrimination partly due to tactics employed by 
white people to make Other white people appear “less white,” thereby producing social 
difference and inequality.  
 Hartigan (1999a) argues that whiteness is constructed in similar ways to other 
racial categorisations, shaped by social-class dynamics, geographical location, and cultural 
labels. Henderson and Tickamyer (2009) support Hartigan’s point by suggesting that, even 
as a dominant identity, whiteness does not always result in (full) privilege and power. One 
can lose his or her white “status”; so while race may define whiteness, distinctions in class 
and culture determine boundaries of privilege (p. 59). Due to this transgressive boundary 
identity, whiteness can be displaced and interrogated via class so that it becomes 
disempowered, imperfect, “Othered”:  trashed. Hill (1997) asserts that within the process 
of interrogating whiteness, the white identity “threatens itself with becoming something 
else again, a subject of difference: white difference – ‘white trash’” (p. 159). Consequently, 
white trash enters the “postmodern critique as an unwanted agent of white remarkability” 
(p. 160). 
 When putting the two terms together – “white” and “trash” – a type of symbiotic, 
contradictory, and paradoxical relationship occurs. “White trash” is a boundary term 
distinguishing between whites and revealing itself as “an expression of fundamental 
tension and deep structural antinomies” (Wray, 2006, p. 2). The antinomies that situate the 
white trash discourse within scholarship on whiteness exist between the sacred and 
profane, purity and impurity, cleanliness and dirt. Aside from those opposing categories, 





narrative is about a despised racial group or a disposable class – a contradiction in itself 
since white individuals are treated as non-disposable, and white lives have meaning, 
purpose, and inherent value. The term is a “puzzle with two pieces,” one that may serve to 
undo the racial supremacy embedded within whiteness, and speaks to the hybrid, multiple 
forms of white identity, or the ways that white identity continues to be subject to the same 
racialised differences that produce it. As Wray and Newitz (1997) assert, the utility of 
identifying white trash culture is a “naming practice that helps define stereotypes of what 
is and is not acceptable or normal for whites in the [United States],” but also a critical tool 
in thinking about cultural identities and the social power that is (dis)associated with them 
(p. 4).  
 “White trash” entered common parlance after a few short decades of its 
introduction and became an area of interest and research during the early 18th century in 
the Southern United States (Wray, 2006, p. 72). The introduction of the term followed 
public knowledge and commonplace usage of the term “cracker.” Descriptions of white 
trash subjects conjure myths of promiscuity and violence, and accumulate negative, 
stereotypical images of a Southern, rural-based poor person, an ignorant, good-for-nothing, 
low-life, socially-downcast, racist white: “trailer parks and wife beaters” (Wray, 2006, p. 1). 
Similarly, Squire (1997) illustrates that representations of this type of trailer-park white 
denote images of a “low-class, deviant ‘colour’ analogous to ‘project black’” (p. 245). This 
very lurid typecast remains with us today and applies to those whites whose subordination 
– based on class, crude conduct, and lack of social worth – are too extreme. These 
behaviours go beyond the civility and decency of more refined whites. Such whites were 





Indians, and Hispanics, and were similarly regarded as lazy, immoral, and dirty, or 
alternatively, dangerous, threatening, sexually perverse, and dishonourable (Wray, 2006, p. 
23). Rural, poor, white-trash individuals had only themselves to blame for their low level of 
social respectability; moreover, they “remained undeserving of democratic privileges and 
unable to bear the rights and responsibilities of other white privileged American citizens” 
(Wray, 2006, p. 49).  
 Wray (2006) explains that “white trash rolls off the tongue with such 
condescending ease” (p. 1, emphasis in original) and argues that Americans of all races use 
the term “white trash” to demean and stigmatise white individuals in order to name those 
people “whose very existence seems to threaten the symbolic and social order” (Wray, 
2006, p. 2). The label became so commonplace that both black and white individuals used it 
to discriminate and distinguish low-status, unworthy whites from progressive whites – the 
“good whites” who used the term to detach their own racial and classed group from that of 
the “Other” white group (Newitz, 1997; Wray, 2006). Hartigan (2003) notes the “highly 
emotional response of loathing and disgust the image generates among the white middle 
class” (p. 105). Interestingly, Wray (2006), along with some other scholars, argues that 
while blacks have used “poor white trash” as an act of “symbolic violence and 
micropolitical protest” about white claims to superiority, it was the white, literate, elites 
“who invested its meaning with social power … enforcing its discriminatory effects with 
regard to labor” (p. 43). We learn that black slaves did not occupy the positions of power 
necessary to diminish the quality of life of white servants, but higher status whites most 
certainly did. Despite the differences and, perhaps, the doubts of the term’s origins, one 





 Acknowledging whiteness as a contested and heterogeneous category, Garner 
(2007) explains that the enterprise of marking whiteness as some form of racialised 
identity reflects the examination that is commonly applied to other racialised identities. 
Therefore, whites are closer to the ideal while the white trash, like black and brown bodies, 
border on the polluting and the dangerous. In the social and political constructions of 
whiteness as “racialised,” the ambiguity of whiteness generates those labelled “so-called 
whites,” “off-white,” “not quite whites,” “semi-racialised,” or “conditionally white” among 
others (Preston, 2007, p. 2). While being white trash suggests that one is “not quite-“ or 
“so-called white,” being “so-called white” or any of the other aforementioned designations 
does not always- or necessarily imply trashiness.  
 The ever-shifting nature of whiteness tells us not only that the category “white” is 
flexible but that what it means to be a white person is changeable and inconsistent. 
Whiteness as trashed offers a compelling narrative that posits whiteness as being 
malleable, fluid, and questionable – encompassing a varied population of whites. Analysing 
the situation of white trash individuals provides not only a critical basis for grasping the 
effects of “race” and why race and class divisions are crucial identity markers, but, as Wray 
(2005) explains, gives us a reason to “move beyond generalised statements about 
whiteness and blackness” (p. 147).  
 Persons labelled “white trash” identify with and operate from a different 
positionality within whiteness than those regarded as esteemed/privileged whites. White 
trash individuals threaten the symbolic richness – literally – of whiteness. We see that, 
while these individuals are white, their white privilege is under threat; their disordered 





whiteness. Seeing an individual as white trash devalues that person’s white status and their 
merit. As Wray (2005) illustrates, the “imagined boundary between whiteness and 
blackness is undermined” so that the label white trash is used to typify those white bodies 
that have transcended their own raced space – “exceed[ing] the class and racial etiquettes 
required of whites” (p. 115). We can easily see how one term can encompass multiple 
aspects of identities but only some of the benefits and privileges that traditionally 




[4] Theoretical Framework & Conceptual Tools  
Theories that address hierarchical arrangements of power and privilege are examined in 
this chapter. The theoretical base employed in my research draws on the theories of critical 
race, intersectionality, and white privilege to examine how systems of power are part of 
American legal discourse.  
Critical Race Theory: Racial Privilege and American Law 
Derrick Bell, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, and Patricia Williams are only few of 
the key critical race theorists who have foregrounded racism and power in American 
criminal law (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Critical Race Theory (henceforth: CRT), 
commonly associated with American black feminist theory, emerged as an academic 
movement within American legal scholarship as a way of addressing not only the subtle 
and deeply entrenched varieties of racisms at play today (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012, p. 2), 
but also the legislative practices that work to privilege and oppress certain groups of 
people within a legal context (Schur, 2002; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Seiler, 2003; 
Henderson & Tickamyer, 2009). Furthermore, CRT was developed in the 1970s as a 
critique to features of the law that did not address racial discourse particularly in the 
judicial system and its application in the real world (Seiler, 2003; Barak, 2010). To buttress 
this point, Delgado & Stefanic (2001) argue that CRT helps contextualise how individuals 
are categorised and hierarchised based on power and social dominance, and that there is a 
hidden, ingrained relationship between white supremacy and law in the American cultural 
context.  
 According to Delgado & Stefancic (2012), a number of “basic insights” serve as the 





more subtle in form, is an “ingrained” and normal, not an aberrant or exceptional, feature of 
American society that has been naturalised overtime and across space (p. 2–4). Another 
feature of CRT acknowledges that civil rights law has been (more) beneficial to all whites 
than to other racialised groups (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012, p. 4), so even those whites “who 
lack wealth and power are sustained in their sense of racial superiority by policy decisions 
that sacrifice black rights” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012, p. 13).  
While CRT has gained traction within the legal field, many scholars in various other 
disciplines employ aspects of this theory to study the relationship between race and racism 
in the United States. With the work that I do, I use CRT as an analytical lens to help me 
think through the privileges that are often left unspoken but nonetheless embedded within 
whiteness. To do this, I consider how “race” as a category (of membership) is mobilised in 
ways that accord substantial benefit to white people while sacrificing or neglecting those 
same privileges and advantages to racialised groups within a legal context. Applying CRT to 
my research is undoubtedly crucial as it further allows me to illuminate and operationalise 
tactics of white supremacist ideology by examining the centrality of race, how the law 
sustains white hegemony, and how whiteness intersects with other identities of privilege 
(i.e., gender, class, age, and (hetero)sexuality).   
Intersectionality Theory: The Interlocking of Identities and Other Forms of “Isms” 
To understand a system of intersecting privileges, it is imperative to address the 
hierarchical relations of power that are maintained through different and multiple forms of 
identity. I employ an intersectional analysis to this research, which adds a crucial 
perspective at such converging power hierarchies. Using intersectionality allows me to 





precisely how power operates through a series of intertwined and interdependent 
channels and variables.  
 Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in the early 1990s, intersectionality – which comes 
out of the critical race movement – has gained recognition in its study of various systems of 
inequality and oppression. Racial minority scholars have used the idea of “intersections” to 
explain their lives and to critique the exclusion of their experiences, needs, perspectives, 
and voices from white, Eurocentric, middle-class conceptualisations of both feminist and 
male-dominated spheres (Dill, 2009; Dill & Zambrana, 2009a; Henderson & Tickamyer, 
2009).   
 Intersectionality, as a theoretical template, allows for openness and creativity to 
understand identities and social locations. One of the most promising aspects of this theory 
is its opposition to single-identity-based theories and approaches that can reduce 
individuals to one category at a time and limit scholarship to a narrow, impaired 
perspective (Crenshaw, 1991). Similarly, single-axis approaches do not penetrate deep 
within to allow for a complex interrogation of how identity is multi-layered and 
intertwined, and how systems of privilege are all interconnected.  
 Intersectionality encompasses a range of discourses and practices whereby we 
come to understand how individuals live at the crossroads of various terms of difference 
with regards to age, ability, race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, class and occupation, 
and education amongst other variables (Fiske, 1996; Byrne, 2006). An intersectional 
approach can help reveal privileges, “especially when we remember that the intersection is 
multi-dimensional” (Wildman & Davis, 2000, p. 662). By using intersectionality as a 





that differentially advantage and disadvantage groups depending on their social location” 
(Andersen & Collins, 2007, p. 62). As such, I am better prepared to investigate the 
configuration of lived identities which “affect[s] how people act, the opportunities that are 
available to them, and the way in which their behaviour is socially defined,” as one is never 
solely raced, or gendered, or heterosexed, or classed, or able-bodied at any given time 
(Burgess-Proctor, 2006, p. 39).  
Examining privilege in its operative state is one of the principal reasons 
intersectionality has been favourable for my research. By understanding different forms of 
identity and lived experiences, I acknowledge that Casey Anthony is not one identity (i.e., 
just raced or just gendered) at any given time, as lived experiences are certainly much more 
complex than that (Jiwani, 2006). To study race or gender on their own platforms is 
insufficient and unnecessarily limits the scope of my analysis, resulting in a “hollow vision 
that cannot do justice” (Wildman & Davis, 2000, p. 662). These categories of membership 
for Casey Anthony, working to reinforce, buttress, and naturalise one another, must be 
integrated so that their relationship to privilege is properly contextualised – deployed from 
many different locations and social venues – and not centralised or reducible to an 
independent, single-structural source.  
The Theorisation of Whiteness: White Supremacy and White Privilege  
Many studies confirm that to be white in the United States is to be the recipient of 
numerous advantages, benefits, basic rights, and futures, especially in treatment from law 
enforcement, the criminal justice system, and the judiciary courts (McIntosh, 1988, 1998; 





One crucial focus of studying whiteness as theory examines how “transparent 
forms of ‘whiteness’ reinforce the existing racial understandings and racial order of 
society” (Doane, 2003, p.10). My research engages with notions of white supremacy and 
white privilege to help deconstruct the “transparent” features of whiteness prevalent in 
race scholarship.  
White supremacy, as Graham (2012) suggests, gives us a set of institutions, 
practices, patterns, and social settings that maintain a cultural system in which conscious, 
deliberate and unconscious ideas of white domination and superiority are reinforced 
through the privileging of whites over non-whites. Jensen (2005) supports this notion, 
explaining that white supremacist societies have ongoing ideological belief systems rooted 
in the “inherent superiority” of whites (p. 3) – so that benefits are granted to those who, by 
race, hold positions of power in the institutions that comprise a white racist society. 
Preston (2007) argues that the notion of white supremacy is “operationally” more 
satisfying than white privilege as it works to commonly identify the “conscious and 
dysconscious racial strategies” that permit and legitimise the continuation of racial 
hierarchies (p. 82).  
However, white supremacy cannot exist without white privilege, for white 
privilege, an important feature in studies of whiteness, is white supremacy unchallenged 
and thoroughly reinforced in all parts of American society. Therefore, while white privilege 
and white supremacy are distinct terms, they are, indeed, fused together and have been 
important concepts for my interrogation of the Anthony case. It would, essentially, be 





does not make reference to the supremacy of whiteness and the benefits/privileges that 
are afforded to white people.   
 My theorisation of “race” complicates notions of whiteness to include how 
“whiteness” is a lived-out, social construct. While focusing on white subjectivity is an 
important endeavour and a critical aspect of this project, I run the risk of “categorical 
thinking,” which obscures “our vision of the whole, in which multiple strands [of identity] 
interrelate with each other” (Wildman & Davis, 2000, p. 662). To avoid such categorical 
thinking, intersectionality theory keeps the focus on white femininity while still analysing 
depictions of white superiority in its base.    
Theorising the White Trash Identity  
The contradictory nature of whiteness, explains Leroux (2010), centers on raising queries 
regarding whether “whiteness is simply organised around some sort of un-named, invisible 
group solidarity” (p. 25). Ruth Frankenberg (1993), one of the first scholars to address the 
cultural significance of whiteness, explains that there are “two kinds of whites … those who 
are truly or only white, and those who are white but also something more – or is it 
something less?” (p. 198).  
The term white trash is used in racialised contexts where class and race 
distinctions become conflated or, as Hartigan (1997b) phrases it, “overlapping rather than 
remaining clear and distinct” (p. 47). The racialisation of white trashed individuals is 
fundamentally a classed phenomenon, so that while white trash emphasises a certain class 
threat, it does so in a setting where the boundaries of race – precisely, blackness and 
whiteness – become unstable and intermixed. In chapters six and seven, I use the notions of 





presented through counsels’ narratives. On the one hand, Casey Anthony is characterised as 
a white, innocent woman, and on the other, she is branded as a criminal who (should be) 
without white privilege.  
 White trash, argue Newitz and Wray (2013), is not just a classist slur, but also a 
“racial epithet that marks off, or marks out, certain whites as a breed apart, a dysgenic race 
into themselves”: as social outcasts (p. 2). Hartigan (1997b) states that this process of 
“marking out” certain whites illustrates the social differences that matter most to 
Americans. White trash identity, he proceeds, is a “means of inscribing social distance and 
insisting upon a contempt-laden social divide” (p. 49–50). White trash denotes taking a 
historically unnamed race, often synonymous with opulence and status, and coupling it 
with an insult that literally means economic waste: discarded material and pollution 
(Hartigan, 1997b, p. 51). For working-class or impoverished whites, the class variable is 
exercised in relation to being typified as lacking social worth, capital, and credibility. That 
is, privileged whites evaluate the behaviours and opinions of Other whites, particularly 
those of a lower social and class status, and scream “we are not that!” (Hartigan, 1997b, p. 
51). Newitz (1997) asserts that when these distinctions are laid out, as in, between the 
lower classes and the middle-upper classes, the differences that exist showcase the 
opposition between civilised and primitive bodies, between the demeaned and the 
respected (p. 134). The features of white trash that Wray (2006) explores include the 
“effects of symbolic distancing and social exclusion through moral disapproval, resulting in 
‘us/them’ dichotomies that both enable and enact different forms of inequality, prejudice, 
and discrimination” (p. 134). The terms “inequality,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination” 





 Although the central claim in this thesis reinforces the interlocking privileges of 
white womanhood, in no way do I (further) suggest that Casey Anthony is a “white trashed” 
woman according to familiar discourse. However, orienting a discussion on “white trash” in 
my analysis of the prosecutorial narrative felt necessary for the time when writing this 
research. I have used terms such as “racialised,” “Other,” or “inferior white” throughout the 
thesis to help complicate whiteness by simultaneously positioning Casey Anthony inside 
and outside spaces of white privilege. I am particularly cautious because my use of these 
terms engages a tension between the subjectivities of "racialised individuals” and “inferior 
whites.” In no way do I (wish to) suggest that the two groups are equally situated and 
maintain the same place of disadvantage on the social hierarchy. The two racial categories 
differ greatly, though “lower status,”  “not-quite,” or “inferior” whites are often ascribed 
with many of the same attitudes, beliefs, character traits, mind sets, and morals of those 
individuals that constitute the “racialised” category. Through narration, the prosecution not 
only calls into question the integrity of Casey Anthony’s whiteness but also relies 
(indirectly) on such racialising discourses to displace her from a space of white privilege. 
Herein conceives the white trash dialogue.  
 Without any theoretical consideration for how the white trash discourse is 
conceptualised, much of the function and argument of this thesis gets lost. Using elements 
of white trash as a theoretical lens allows me to develop a more robust argument around 
the category “white” and the boundary that marks the edges of that racial category – 





[5] Research Methodology & Method 
My thesis offers a critical discursive analysis of the texts written by the prosecution and 
defence in Florida v. Anthony. The texts which serve as my primary data sources are: 
Imperfect Justice: Prosecuting Casey Anthony written by Jeff Ashton – Orlando state 
prosecutor and second chair to the prosecutorial team (with Lisa Pulitzer) – and Presumed 
Guilty – Casey Anthony: The Inside Story written by Jose Baez, lead lawyer (with Peter 
Golenbock) for the defence counsel. 
The Art behind Critical Discourse Analysis  
Critical discourse analysis is the study of spoken language, conversation, or narrated 
speech perceived to be purposeful (Brown, 1983; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). McHoul and 
Grace (1997) explain that critical discourse analysis is “geared towards a counter-reading 
of historical and social conditions and offers possibilities for social critique and renewal” 
(p. 27). The aim of those who use discourse analysis is to interpret meaning and map out 
the processes in which discourse structures the social to the point where its meanings 
become so conventionalised that we think of them as real and natural (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002, 25–26). As Van Dijk (1985) argues, discourse analysis is a method that contributes to 
our understanding of “social processes, strategies, and contextualisation of discourse acts 
as a mode of interaction in highly complex socio-cultural situations” (p. 1). This approach is 
useful for examining how specific discursive constructions of race and gender are related to 
the dynamism of power and dominance, and how these discourses constitute and are 
constituted by the particular groups and individuals who employ power. 
My textual analysis employs a critical discursive approach to study the language 





discourses of race and gender. A critical discourse approach helps to deconstruct the ways 
in which whiteness and femininity were re-defined and how they were contested. 
Language is the medium by which Casey Anthony is constructed through these social 
discourses; through language I studied the meanings that inform the texts and analysed the 
language beyond the sentences to explore what each narrative is designed to tell us. In this 
way, I could view the issues from a critical perspective and gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the narratives articulated from both counsels’ perspectives. By 
uncovering what is hidden or not immediately obvious within these stories, I have been 
able to expose the relations of power and privilege that underlie them.  
Critical discourse analysis is more than a method of data analysis, rather, it 
incorporates both theoretical and methodological questions by exploring, in my case, the 
ways Casey Anthony was subjected to different and competing narratives of guilt and 
innocence, and how her status as a white female was used to articulate those narratives 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4). Theory and method are intertwined, working together to 
provide tools and strategies through which I can analyse the language used to construct 
and describe Casey Anthony, while helping me to interrogate the discourses at play. My 
questions centred around how discourses of whiteness and femaleness are constructed and 
portrayed, how whiteness is (re)produced and contested, how white femininity gets 
explained so as to maintain hegemonic discourses, and who is/are the subject(s) that these 
discourses are constructing. In addition, I examined how events are presented, how these 
narratives are being articulated, and how these narratives contribute to the difficulty of 
naming white women’s criminality. I focused on what things were said, how they were said 





articulations to my overall research. With these questions in mind, I discuss some of the 
underlying themes in the literature on whiteness looking at how sets of discourses inherent 
in each narrative for counsels operated throughout this case to (re)produce or challenge 
those same ongoing themes.  
Engaging with the Data for Florida v. Anthony 
My project examines the narratives of the prosecution and defence, and analyses the 
arguments that are drawn up, the cultural and contextual resources as recounted in their 
books, and the methods each narrative uses to persuade its readership of its authenticity. 
To achieve this, I approached the two stories as relevant materials from which to read, 
interpret, flesh out, and de-construct the discourses of whiteness and femaleness by both 
counsels in the Anthony case. The texts used for this research provide salient perspectives 
on how the Anthony case developed and offer insight into the construction of the defendant 
by both legal parties.  
 To explain how notions of whiteness (and white femininity) were mobilised in the 
books published after the completion of the Anthony trial, I coded my data by organising 
multi-layered and raw data into categories, themes, and concepts based on my 
methodology (Neuman, 2011). Coding enables the researcher to reduce large bodies of text 
into more contained, manageable pieces of information (Neuman, 2011). A few broad 
concepts, ideas, and themes emerged in my initial reading; more conspicuously, the images 
of the defendant constructed by each counsel stood in stark opposition to one another. 
From the quite-telling photograph of the defendant on each text’s cover, revealing a 
particular ideology conducive to each counsel’s goal of an acquittal or conviction, down to 





portrayed in counsels’ works, these narratives “bring together a number of character 
evaluations” that render the defendant either “worthy of mercy or death” (Cotton, 1955, p. 
154).  
 Reading the texts a second time consisted of a more engaged and elaborate 
examination of the explicit and implicit references that were made about the defendant, as 
these held the most significance to the research. Moreover, references to whiteness and 
femaleness as they pertained to the defendant were noted for further analysis in assessing 
how white femininity was constructed and how the centrality of whiteness operated 
throughout this case. To do this, essentially, I “jumped through many hoops,” fleshing out 
alternative and more concealed meanings, and looking for hints in language that spoke to 
and for whiteness and femaleness. “Whiteness” was a profoundly intricate discourse that 
required numerous discussions with my committee members in addition to many required 
readings of not only my data, but also works theorising whiteness.  
 On the third read of my two primary texts, I designed a spreadsheet in which I 
coded and focused on two distinct elements: [1] the construction and mobilisation of 
whiteness in speaking about the defendant; and [2] emerging themes that incorporated 
implicit and explicit raced and gendered discourses, along with how the enmeshing of those 
tropes worked to produce a particular epistemology about white femininity. I became more 
liberal in how I interpreted and recorded what the discourses meant. Working with a 
spreadsheet helped to organise my findings so that upon reviewing my concepts, using the 
“find” tool allowed me to confine the time it would have taken for me to flip through 
jottings on paper. After I recorded notes about what the terms and concepts told me in 





fourth reading. Specifically, I looked at how those same concepts and meanings were used 
to articulate different constructs about Casey Anthony. During the coding process I 
repeatedly read the texts to draw out new and more elaborate information on each re-
reading. This extensive review of my data ensured that I was able to not only thoroughly 
understand the discourses, but also make connections between the discourses and their 
social meanings.   
 The two most prominent categories that emerged from the data involved the ways 
that counsels constructed Casey Anthony as either a criminal or a victim by using her 
“whiteness” to articulate their points. What surfaced was a story about the hegemonic 
power to either accept or resist particular accounts and dominant American ideologies 
about white womanhood. Kaplan (2012) argues that defendant stories often use and rely 
on the “same dominant and repressive ideologies” so that the stories told by legal actors 
can only present “alternative versions of dominant ideologies, not by directly challenging 
the dominant ideologies themselves” (Kaplan, 2012, p. xix, emphasis in original). I revealed 
how racism and sexism were co-constituted and employed to provide alternative 
constructions of Casey Anthony’s criminal and victim, “white” and “feminine” statuses. I 
believe that devoting a chapter to these alternative constructed versions of identity reflects 
the adversarial nature of prosecuting and defence counsels and is the foundation upon 
which this entire thesis is based: Two narratives. Two characterisations. Two voices.  Two 
theories of the crime. But only one verdict that ultimately brings us back to the normative 




 [6] Contradicting Discourse: Whiteness 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses and interprets the conflicting narratives that pertain to Casey 
Anthony’s15 “white” identity. By applying theories of whiteness and race, I will not only 
explain how the prosecution and defence’s legal accounts work to counter one another, but 
also highlight how whiteness was deployed by all actors in Casey’s placement within and 
removal from spaces of whiteness. Furthermore, this chapter includes an explanation of 
how the prosecution and defence attempted to identify Casey as both a criminal and victim 
through her whiteness and access to white privilege.  
 Since my analysis is rooted in understanding the United States as a particular kind 
of colonial space, and the law as a kind of “white” space residing within it, examining 
whiteness is a necessary part of my critique. Whiteness, argues Byers (2010a), “needs no 
descriptors” (p. 36); the idea of “no descriptors,” Nayak (2007) reminds us, comes from 
whiteness’ ability to remain a “taken-for granted category, something so ordinary it can 
pass without remark” (p. 738). An ideological and hegemonic belief system exists that 
allows advantages, allocates benefits, and grants privileges to whites solely due to race. 
Whiteness is, therefore, a position of structural and systematic advantage and race 
privilege (Frankenberg, 1993, p. 1). The white subject, Leroux (2010) informs us, “has been 
assumed as a universal and natural subject position” (p. 21). This historically-constructed 
“position privileges those who are constructed as white in any given social and historical 
context” (Leroux, 2010, p. 22, emphasis in original). In my analysis, being able to locate 
cultural, institutional, and systemic illustrations of white privilege is imperative. By 
                                                             
15 Throughout this chapter and the proceeding analytical chapter, I will address Casey Anthony as simply “Casey.” This is done 





understanding how race is taken up in discussions of privilege and power throughout the 
Anthony case, I can thoroughly examine situations where the white subject continues to 
receive advantages and benefits regardless of the context.  
Prosecutorial Narrative 
 In a discourse of intraracial difference, deployed to decide what counts as whiteness, the 
prosecution challenged the status of Casey’s white identity on multiple occasions, while the 
defence sought to salvage her whiteness through arguments of their own. The way in which 
Casey’s raced identity was constructed suggests that the prosecution spoke of Casey’s 
debased “whiteness” by illustrating how she neglected white hegemony.  
 
Emphasised Whiteness: Humanising Caylee Anthony 
Ashton’s use of racially-coded language to describe Caylee as an “angelic, bright-eyed baby 
girl,” as well as his repeated endeavours to “whiten” Caylee, showcases the raced 
undertones in the prosecution’s argument (p. 25). Calling her an incredible “light and joy” 
(p. 186), Ashton adopts terms such as “angelic,” “bright-eyed,” and “baby girl” to suggest 
whiteness, purity, and innocence. His expression of Caylee’s discursively white racial 
features which, on their own, are highly privileged, signifies that she was a white little girl 
who was born to a white mother. Additionally, his description of Caylee’s attire the last day 
that she was reportedly seen – a blue jean skirt, pink top, white tennis shoes, white-rimmed 
sunglasses, and a backpack “decorated with little monkeys”, with her brown hair pulled 
back in a ponytail – serves to humanise and normalise the white child. Throughout the trial 





hope to bring the jury back to the toddler by humanising her, to get them to see her 
as someone they would ultimately care about … she was a real person, a little girl, 
and hopefully, she would take center stage long enough to make an impact and 
capture some hearts. Knowing Caylee would help the jury truly understand the 
case. (p. 248) 
 
The prosecution persistently reinforced Caylee’s whiteness by employing language that 
had “force, power, and credibility,” which are commonly used to argue the victim-status of 
white girls and women in America (Stabile, 2006, p. 168). By indicating that Caylee was a 
“real person” and a “little girl” who needed to be “humanised” and “cared about,” the 
prosecution presented her to the jury as a child deserving of sympathy. This 
characterisation was used to convince the jury to convict Casey (the purported killer) of 
murder on the premise that our guardianship and loyalties are owed to our most precious 
resources: children – notably white children. 
When prosecuting counsel made their argument for the death penalty against 
Casey, they stated quite powerfully that: 
Caylee was almost three when she died with duct tape over her nose and her mouth 
… any child of that age should have had the physical ability to remove the duct tape 
covering her airway and preventing her from breathing, and the evidence in this 
case would show that Caylee was, if not average, above average in that regard … if 
she was physically restrained, her killer would have to restrain her arms by some 
means, applying tape while she was conscious as her killer looked into her face. 
Maybe her killer even saw her eyes as the tape was applied. (p. 175) 
 
This description employed a strategy of humanising and, in the process, (all the more) 
whitening Caylee. Her “human,” victim status was strongly emphasised, and never disputed 
by the prosecution, law enforcement, or the media; she could only and always be a white 







An Embodiment of Whiteness 
Despite being objectively white, Casey’s whiteness was symbolically and strategically 
deconstructed and negotiated. Throughout the prosecution’s narrative, the distinction 
between “being white” and “embodying whiteness” was clear. Casey’s whiteness was not 
concealed; rather, the construction of her personhood, her debased subjectivity, did not 
correlate with “real whiteness.”16 The prosecutorial team degraded Casey’s white 
personhood by constructing her outside of such rigid boundaries of whiteness. Through 
this exclusion from white space, the white-Other binary is realised. 
One way that the prosecution portrayed Casey’s debased white identity was 
through a description of her as someone who “seemed to have an excuse or an alibi for 
everything” (p. 34). Constructed outside of real whiteness, which emphasises honesty, 
Casey was not to be trusted, as she provided “various excuses why she and Caylee could not 
return home, including a twelve-day stay in Jacksonville, Florida, with a male friend” 
(Ashton, 2012, p. 17). Moreover, Laura Shultz, a psychotherapist studying the Anthony 
case, revealed that: 
Throughout [Casey’s] taped interviews and conversations with police, not only did 
her version of the facts repeatedly change, but more telling is the fact that she 
spoke of her child in the past tense even before the body was discovered. This type 
of behaviour gives very specific clues to a clinician. (as cited in Walker & Filia, 2011, 
p. 520, emphasis mine) 
 
Casey’s dishonesty is implicitly linked to the stereotypical white trashed or racialised 
individual whose word is always open to mistrust, dispute, and scrutiny. Her description of 
events and her questionable behaviour warranted criticism by not only the prosecution, 
but also law enforcement and the media. By linking Casey’s behaviour to those taken up in 
                                                             






discourses of deviance and criminality, her demeanour became central to strategies that 
enforced her Other status. 
 Much of the prosecution’s construction of Casey amplified the image of her as 
dishonest, thereby challenging her claims to whiteness. Casey’s “composure was not the 
only suspicious thing; the story [of her missing daughter] itself grew increasingly more 
preposterous” (Ashton, 2012, p. 30); eventually, her narrative went “from implausible to 
impossible” (p. 56). The representation of Casey’s dishonest conduct betrayed white 
hegemony and marked her as a debased white woman, especially since caring for and 
protecting her white child were not her primary foci. In mainstream America, “only when 
the body is perceived as being out of place, either from its natural environment or its 
national boundaries” do we understand a foreign body: a pathological body (Mohanram, 
1999, p. xii). An inferior white body is a foreign body in white spaces. Casey’s apparent lack 
of concern about the welfare of her white child, evinced by her seemingly calm and 
detached demeanour, tells us that she is not a moral and benevolent white person; Casey 
did not maintain the decorum that white motherhood routinely depends on. 
According to Ashton, Casey remained unmoved by the ordeal of her missing 
daughter so that “it seemed that no appeal – not to Caylee’s safety, not to the damaging 
impact this was having on her family – could stir a reaction in Casey” (p. 46). In fact, “she 
remained emphatic about her original story” (p. 48). Even Lazzaro, Casey’s boyfriend, 
confirmed that “during the time Casey was living with him, she’d told him on multiple 
occasions that Caylee was with the nanny, either at Disneyworld, Universal Studios, or the 
beach” (p. 57). Casey “was far from [a] normal” white person, as the prosecution’s narrative 





embraces (p. 46). While Ashton claims white privilege due to his race (as well as his gender 
and class), he attempts to remove Casey from accessing that same white privilege on the 
basis of her race (and arguably even her class status) – which were the antithesis to his. 
The prosecution worked hard to bring this narrative to fruition by demonstrating that/how 
whiteness does not, and should not, always guarantee privilege to all white people. 
Displacing Casey to the margins of whiteness can be viewed as a way of diminishing and 
discrediting her white status, thereby making her “lesser than” so that, in the end, she 
would be vulnerable to conviction and execution.  
 
The Social Distance between “Us” and “Them” 
To assert that two or more things (or individuals) do not belong in the same category is to 
argue that they do not share a common property, characteristic, or identity (Wray, 2006, p. 
7–8). Ashton’s narrative of Casey complicates notions of whiteness to include not only the 
processes of attributing difference, but also how whiteness and its associated privileges can 
be socially contested. Moten and Jenkins (2001) describe white trash identity as a failed, 
“tarnished whiteness” (p. 152). This “contaminated identity” is consumed by “troubling  ... 
problematic white bodies” who are on the “edge of sociality” and exhibit a trait of 
“backwardness” or “unruly behaviour” (Hartigan, 1997c, p. 317–18). In support of this 
argument, Henderson and Tickamyer (2009) argue that the white trash discourse positions 
certain whites as “aberrant anomalies” (p. 58). 
Casey’s behaviour and falsified “truths,” which were argued to be not merely 
habitual, but also purposeful, were used as a reference to her odd and unconventional ways 





status as a white individual did not seem to fit her behaviour – she was certainly “different” 
(Ashton, 2012, p. 49). Furthermore, within the Anthony family “it was Casey alone that 
appeared to be the anomaly,” and “without Casey they were really quite normal” (Ashton, 
2012, p. 186). This description of intra-racial difference creates a sense of distance and 
dislocation between Casey and her family, but also more specifically between the 
prosecution and Casey, thereby reinforcing the binary of “us” (Ashton/prosecution) versus 
“her” (Casey).  
From the beginning of his narrative, Ashton notes he was always most suspicious 
about Casey’s “calmness” since “most parents would be in hysterics if their child was 
missing” (p. 22). He compares her reaction to his own emotions when he briefly lost his 
own son on a crowded beach. Within minutes his child was safely returned, but Ashton 
could still recall “those few moments of paralyzing panic … eternally etched in my 
memory,” unlike Casey who lived carefree for over a month “without any sense of urgency 
or emotion” (p. 22–23). Employing this discourse of difference addresses the white space 
that makes the behaviours and morals of Ashton markedly different from Casey’s. 
Throughout the prosecutorial narrative, Casey was never spoken about in a realm of 
“sameness” or “we-ness,” which is generally used in discourses about white people; rather, 
she was differentiated based on conduct, morals, and principles commonly employed to 
signal distance when describing criminals, inferior whites, or racialised bodies. To cement 
her exclusion and division, the defendant was not constructed as an all-American white 
woman who could be easily relatable. Casey was characterised as though she was “not like 
us” and, in a circuitous way, not like white people since the most honoured position for 





During the trial, the three prosecuting attorneys told each other stories of “the 
panic that arose from even momentary loss of contact with one of [their] kids” (p. 128). 
Reflecting on Casey’s behaviour while her daughter was missing, the co-counsel members 
simply could not imagine “as a prosecutor, as a parent, as a person” that any individual 
could hold such little regard for her own child (p. 128). Casey’s unashamed and uncaring 
behaviour “didn't even hint at the hysteria one would expect … her demeanor just didn't 
make sense" (p. 30). This appeared to be a vivid manifestation of her alleged involvement 
in the crime; her sense of disregard allowed her to avoid taking responsibility for what had 
occurred. In fact, her main concern when she did contact her family was only to retrieve 
her boyfriend’s telephone number. It appeared that “while Caylee was missing (and 
perhaps dead at that point) Casey’s concerns appeared to be solely about her own welfare 
and comfort, and her connections with people (even her own parents) seem[ed] to be 
shallow in nature” (as cited in Walker & Filia, 2011, p. 520).  
Ashton constructs Casey as someone who could never inhabit the same space of 
white privilege and morality that he and his co-counsel occupied. This signalled the dearth 
of Casey’s whiteness (in contrast to its presence). Rather, his reading of her intimated that 
she rightfully belonged to an “omnibus category for everything that is out of place” 
(Hartigan, 1997c, p. 20). The general tone of the prosecutorial narrative reaffirmed the 
great social distance between “them” and “her” – despite all actors in this scenario being 
white. Furthermore, to buttress Ashton’s remarks, Casey’s father expressed his own 
distance from his daughter, thereby employing his own whiteness in the narrative. He told 
Ashton that “Casey lives on the edge. You know that from all the lies. All the contradictions. 





other stuff” (p. 68). George’s admission demonstrates an execution of his perceived “real 
whiteness” from Casey’s “so-called whiteness.” Casey’s moral compass, pointing outside of 
her race, leads us to believe that she did not belong – not even within her own family.  
The Anthony family maintained a close relationship, especially when Casey was out 
of the picture. Prosecutors portrayed Casey’s parents as caring, committed individuals who 
were well-liked in their neighbourhood and had steady employment for many years as a 
nurse and a law enforcement officer. “Nobody came forward with any horror stories about 
either one of them,” Ashton (2012) stated; in fact, “they were the picture of a loving and 
committed couple raising two children into young adulthood” (p. 186). While the 
prosecution argued that Casey came from a fairly stable home, she did not fit the 
expectation that a child growing up in a loving, stable home will “be good” and “do good 
works” (Byers, 2009, p. 44). Her weak work ethic could be perceived as a “badge of 
resistance” or a sign of her uncaring nature, but it also underscored her failure to own (or 
live up to) her family upbringing (Byers, 2009, p. 49). For his part, Ashton could only 
imagine “just how hard it was for [her parents] to accept the reality of what their daughter 
had become” (p. 320). In this sense, Casey was Othered and perceived as a “threat from 
within the very nationalist vision [she] is said to disrupt” (McElya, 2001, p. 157, emphasis in 
original). We see that the divide between the prosecution and the Anthony family, as part of 
a white civilised, normal space, and Casey, far removed from such space(s), was all that it 
took to have that division narrated. 
Ashton (2012) notes that it was “hard to say what it was about Casey that impacted 
everyone in the family so dramatically,” but “Casey infected the entire family” (p. 186). The 





an “atypical” white woman’s status. An example of Casey’s disordered ways was her 
decision to “implicate someone beyond herself as a way to deflect blame” regarding her 
daughter’s death (p. 207). Indeed, Casey herself attempted to use the discourse of 
whiteness and Otherness in her description of Caylee’s nanny as a “half black and half 
Puerto Rican, twenty-five year old [woman] originally from New York” with “dark brown 
curly hair and brown eyes” who had kidnapped her daughter (p. 28). Relying on the 
ideology of white supremacy, Casey, as a white person, had permission to deflect blame to 
the racially-prescribed Other. However, from Ashton’s perspective, “Casey had nowhere 
else to go with the mysterious abductor story, so she needed a new narrative” (p. 206) – 
namely, blaming her father for Caylee’s death. When Cindy and George were notified of her 
accusation that George had sexually abused her, Cindy reassured her husband that “nobody 
believes this … I don’t know what’s wrong with her!” (p. 219). As the story went, 
“everything was on George. Casey took no responsibility whatsoever. That was always her 
position” (p. 208). The allegations of abuse bolstered Ashton’s claim that Casey was 
abnormal, different, and clearly “marked”; even Cindy “was finally willing to admit that 
there was something not right about Casey” p. 219).  
Ashton, as a white expert – and an embodiment of the American law – employed his 
own white privilege by painting Casey as destructive and flawed, thereby exposing her 
failure as a respectable white woman. Since Casey’s parents had certain expectations of her, 
they could not understand why Casey could not or chose not “to work and contribute to the 
household,” though she could have: “maybe she was just lazy … or maybe she felt entitled 
and didn’t want to work” (p. 241). This type of indolent behaviour and mentality reaffirms 





who are viewed as lazy and greedy people who do not engage in any form of economic 
activity for self- and social betterment. According to Ashton, “lying about what Casey did 
during the day was easier than explaining to her parents why she was unemployed” (p. 
241). In addition to her lazy ways, when Casey claimed to be working full-time, she did not 
have a babysitter and her then-fiancé “decided to give up his only days off from work to 
watch Caylee on Mondays. Soon other people in his family were watching the child two 
other days a week” (p. 116). Casey expected – and received – what she was not qualified to 
have and did not want to work hard for. She was known to have stolen thousands of dollars 
from her family, including her grandmother. Perhaps to add to her desperation for a 
“normal” white status, “Casey even wore a laminated ID card around her neck, reinforcing 
the image that she was on her way to a job” (p. 120–21). Casey’s failed virtuous whiteness 
speaks to her rebellious and deceitful ways: she simply had to wear an ID card to deceive 
the world that she was a working, respectful, contributing white member of society. Within 
the white American imagination, racialised and poor, white people are regarded with 
contempt and animosity for these same reasons.  
In his narrative, Ashton iterates the message expressed by one of the protesters 
who called Casey “trash” while trespassing on the Anthonys’ lawn. This could be 
interpreted as his agreement with and avowal of Casey as “trash” – using the protester’s 
message as a way to reinforce his own (p. 109). That Ashton blamed Casey, “the sexually-
abused child trained to lie” (p. 297), for her own misfortunes was part of a discourse 
imbued with racism, similar to the one haunting trashed (or racialised) women as liars and 
cheats. When reports that Casey sold photographs and videos of her daughter were made 





had taken place, [he] was confident that Caylee was already dead and that Casey knew it” 
(p. 192). Consider Ashton’s question: “what kind of mother would sell pictures of her dead 
child for profit?” (p. 192). The implied answer: certainly not one who is part of refined 
white society.  
Perhaps one of the most interesting accounts of mobilised whiteness appeared in 
the perceived social distance between Ashton’s whiteness and Casey’s alleged debased 
whiteness. Casey was isolated from the rest of proper bourgeois society; “at one point the 
defence requested that Casey not be required to appear in court when the motions were 
heard,” but according to Ashton, “we objected, and her presence was required … why 
should we care if she did not want to hear her own attorney’s motions? … part of me felt 
that if I had to sit and listen to him blather on, then she should too” (p. 134–35). This 
example is telling of white privilege in that white people have the power to decide how, in 
what ways, and under what conditions they would allow themselves to be comfortable. We 
see through the prosecution’s narrative, however, that Casey should not be entitled to – or 
seen as worthy of – the same respect and comfort typically bestowed on white people 
(especially within the legal system), thereby making her attendance in court mandatory. 
This relation of difference is highly reflective of the “real” world power dynamics between 
different “shades” of white bodies.  
 
 
Casey Anthony as a Disordered, “White” Woman 
As I have demonstrated above, Casey did not match the cultural stereotype of a moral white 





guilt, according to the prosecution. Casey was suspicious, pushy, loud and foul-mouthed, 
hot-blooded, ever-sassy, quick-with-the-comebacks, and an incomprehensible, sexual 
deviant. It was the inferior status of her “white” subjectivity that Casey was somehow 
attached to, wherein every piece of her whiteness (and its claims to white privilege) was 
discounted. A “real” white woman would never be depicted as controlling, fake, and 
manipulative, as someone who would steal “in times of desperation” (p. 74) with almost 
“every excuse in the book” when she could not repay the money (p. 59). A “real” white 
woman would never be without steady employment, have multiple sexual partners in a 
relatively short time span, gallivant and flaunt her body across town, and end up with a 
bastard child. Casey, as a debased white woman, was an object of property without value, a 
type of “lay-about” who consumed space without purpose. As a woman who could not say 
with certainty who the father of her daughter was, Casey displayed almost every trope of 
trashiness conceivable. Casey was, therefore, a disturbing alternative to hegemonic white 
subjecthood and the refined whiteness that accompanied it.  
 Casey continued to operate without scruples; she was neither graceful nor classy.17  
For example, during the day Cindy located Casey at her boyfriend’s house, “Casey sat in the 
front seat of the vehicle with her arms crossed, giving glaring looks, ‘like a sixteen-year-old 
who’d been caught doing something bad’” (p. 267). She grew more and more angry, 
clenching her fists and taking on an aggravated tone, fuming and pouting that nobody was 
there to comfort her. That same day when Cindy contacted law enforcement concerning 
Casey’s behaviour and the whereabouts of Caylee, Casey sounded dismissive and bothered 
by not only the intrusion of the call, but about the entire event. While addressing the 
                                                             





operator, Casey answered the telephone, “casual, almost uninterested,” with a “’Hello?’ … as 
if ‘hello’ were a question”, and then “deliberately answered … as if she were letting 
someone know about a missed manicure appointment" (Ashton, 2012, p. 21, emphasis in 
original). Casey was dishonest and angry; she had no civility and violated core principles of 
whiteness related to sincerity, and, as a result, she was framed as a criminal. 
 Casey’s inability to take responsibility was also illustrated by her suggestions that 
she was the real “victim” in all of this, that she had nobody around to comfort her, and that 
her parents were the ones allowing her to “[get] truly angry about all of this” (p. 79). 
Everything about Casey was scrutinised and “marked”: from her “smart-ass” responses, to 
her numerous lies, as well as her hostility toward her parents (Baez, 2013, p. 333). The 
anger Casey demonstrated throughout the investigation and proceeding case carried over 
to her time in jail awaiting bail. According to the prosecution, “she appeared adversarial 
because her family seemed to care more about Caylee than they did about the fact that she 
was in jail” (Ashton, 2012, p. 52). The prosecution substantiated this claim by using Casey’s 
harsh confrontations with her family: “if I knew where Caylee was, do you think any of this 
would be happening? No” (p. 54). This character portrayal informs us that a white woman 
with such hostility and anger towards anyone who dared question her, simply because she 
“got arrested on a fucking whim today” and had law enforcement “blaming [her] for stuff 
that [she] never would do” (p. 54), could not possibly be innocent and trustworthy in the 
eyes of the law.  
 Casey’s behaviours did not seem at all fitting for a white woman who was 
concerned about her white child. In fact, she demonstrated a lack of consideration about 





an ordeal (as cited in Walker & Filia, 2011, p. 520). Articulations of her aggression were 
most vivid during Casey’s jailhouse conversations with her family after her arrest in which 
she had referred to them as all just a “waste”: 
I don’t fucking know where she’s at … do me a favour … I don’t want to talk to you 
right now. Forget it … I don’t want any of you coming up here … Like don’t even 
fucking waste your times coming up here… There’s absolutely nothing to find out … 
Oh, my God. Calling you guys, a waste. A huge waste. (p. 52–54) 
 
To the prosecution, “these conversations show[ed] that true, unvarnished Casey, Casey at 
the core” (p. 267). This white woman clearly did not embody whiteness; at her core was a 
white woman of a lesser status. While recounting Casey’s lies during the period when her 
daughter was missing, the prosecution reported that while trying to locate the young child, 
Casey “was nasty to her brother, blew him off, and hung up” the telephone (p. 91). 
Moreover, Casey often complained that “the investigators had misconstrued and twisted 
her words and had not bothered following up on any of the leads18 she had given them” 
despite the fact that following up on the leads early on in the case had resulted in a rather 
fruitless venture (p. 74). Casey lacked what Garber (2001) would call “moral gravitas” and 
did not exhibit white social nicety and diplomacy in the eyes of the prosecution (p. 176).  
Despite the fact that Casey urged her parents to consider posting her bail, as this 
way she could “do something other than sit on [her] butt,” Casey fumed and angrily 
bemoaned that “people expect me, having been in jail for a month, to be able to give helpful 
information … there is nothing more I can do till I am home, and even then I don’t know 
what I can do from that point” (p. 79–80). When Casey’s mother plaintively stated that “we 
need something to go on,” Casey snapped back, almost yelling, “Mom, I don’t have anything 
                                                             





… I’ve been here a month, a month today. Do you understand how I feel? I mean, do you 
really understand how I feel in this?” (p. 78). Casey “was not fazed” by her family’s 
emotional anguish; in actuality she only “persisted with her rant” in which she moaned 
“everything is out of my control” (p. 80).  
 References to Casey’s attitude as insolent in combination with her use of curse 
words and frustrated speech contributed to the characterisation of Casey as being far 
removed from sophisticated whiteness: “no one is letting me talk. I am not in control. 
Everybody wants to know things, but I have nothing to tell” (p. 79). During the trial, while 
Ashton was arguing his case for the death penalty before the judge, “the courtroom was 
silent as a tomb; all I could hear were movements at the defense table … where I referenced 
someone administering the chemical substance, Casey looked angry. Her jaw locked in a 
scowl” (p. 176). Additionally, in an incident when Cindy informed Casey that someone had 
theorised Caylee might have drowned in the family swimming pool, Casey sarcastically 
replied: “surprise, surprise” (p. 78). And in another similar episode when George told his 
daughter that she was the “boss, and not [Baez],” Casey bemoaned (again) that “the police 
are not helping us” and complained that “the cops hadn’t even given her twenty-four hours 
to help find Caylee” (p. 79). Casey grew more infuriated even when her parents tried to 
reassure her by “telling her that she was in charge” (p. 79). Casey’s traits were unnatural to 
her status as a white woman (but conformed to the image of (her as) a trashed woman). 
White women do not allow their presence (be it by their mouths or with their bodies) to be 
known, but trashy white women do (Gilman, 1985; Moten and Jenkins, 2001).  
 Only by understanding that Casey did not embody the refined qualities of a white 





deployment of whiteness, Ashton emphatically states: “I allowed myself to hate [her] … 
There was work to be done that required me to keep my emotions out of it [but] I will 
never forget what I felt in that moment, and how then, just as now, there was no doubt in 
my mind that Casey had killed this beautiful little girl” (p. 145). Here, as elsewhere in 
Ashton’s narrative, the contrast is clear: on the one hand, we have the beautiful little girl, 
the bright-eyed baby, who needed to be “humanised” and “cared about” throughout this 
case – and on the other, we have Casey’s flawed character which needed to be accounted 
for, condemned, punished, and marked for death.  
 
The Racial and Spatial Differences between Ashton and Baez 
The process of Othering is about distances and boundaries of difference and gives 
whiteness the power to deploy itself from an “undefined position of superiority” (Fiske, 
1996, p. 46). As a criminal case commonly involves two sides, opposition and discord will 
typically emerge. Within the prosecution’s story, Ashton was stern in his assessment of not 
only Casey, but also her defence attorney, Jose Baez. Consequently, if whiteness is seen as 
superior and advantaged then we most certainly see the limits of this in Ashton’s analysis 
of Casey and, to a similar degree, in his racialisation of Baez.  
Ashton’s analysis of Baez highlights a paradigm in which whiteness symbolises law, 
order, and morality, and racial-ness represents deviance and lawlessness, disorder, and 
nonconformity. Ashton begins his assessment of Baez “with a disclaimer, an admission of 
bias” in which he openly confesses that he “genuinely dislike[s]” Baez (p. 187). According to 
Ashton, he was “the person to do battle with [Baez]” as he was Baez’s “main adversary” (p. 





mother in New York City, was markedly singled out for his under-par background and 
experience: a high school dropout who was married and with a child by the age of 
seventeen, he was denied admission to the Bar for eight years (p. 188). “The system” 
should not sympathise with, care about, or work for Casey any more than it did for Baez for 
they are the “undeserving” Others. In Ashton’s background-dig on Baez, the attempt to 
“blacken” Baez (even more) is apparent as he informs his readers that Baez was denied 
admittance to the Florida Bar after difficulties with his background investigation, namely 
for financial irregularities (i.e., being unable to pay child support – a prevalent stereotype 
in impoverished communities and discourses of blackness regarding the “poor, broken 
family”) (p. 188). Much like Casey, Baez is portrayed as dishonest, showing us that Ashton 
remained on the side of the (privileged white) law, while Baez was marginalised from it. 
 Racialised persons in white social spaces are regarded as invasive species that need 
to be carefully monitored, controlled, and possibly uprooted (Hart, 2013, p. 94). The 
construction of Baez as a foreign and deviant body demonstrated that he was (and had 
justification to be) excluded entry into that space of privilege that Ashton had the benefit of 
entering and enjoying. Additionally, Baez tried a few unsuccessful business ventures that 
included two online bikini stores; Ashton felt it was necessary to include the web addresses 
of Baez’s failed bikini businesses in his book (p. 188). Perhaps Ashton chose to publicly 
dishonour Baez because there was “an unearned air of arrogance about [Baez] that [was] 
incredibly frustrating to witness” and, according to Ashton, “[Baez] claim[ed] the right to 
that arrogance without the accomplishments to back it up” (p. 189).  
 A part of Ashton’s discussion remained focused on portraying Casey and her 





Ashton viewed Baez’s “appearance” in the media as “unethical and unprofessional” and his 
lawyering skills as “reckless.” He proclaimed that Baez, with his “great deal of superficial 
charm,” never seemed to be concerned about the “accuracy of what he was saying” (p. 187–
89). This recklessness came from “frequently filing motions he had not adequately 
investigated and that were not true” (p. 189). For that reason, Ashton believed Baez 
“deserve[d] to be exposed,” and referred to him as “smarmy: somebody who is slick, 
underhanded, and doesn’t shoot straight” (p. 188–89). Another illustration of Ashton’s 
attempt to “expose” Baez proceeded after the case ended when Baez told him, “you’re the 
toughest motherfucker I’ve ever been up against,” and Ashton felt urged to comment that 
“the list of ‘motherfuckers’ [Baez] had been up against was pretty short” (p. 311).  
The distance between Baez and Ashton was evidently great, as illustrated in 
Ashton’s remark: “even if you’re on opposing sides [with a lawyer], you can’t work with 
someone you don’t trust” (p. 189). Baez was barred from entering the space Ashton could 
only see in himself from an early age: an eight-year-old, self-admitted nerd from a middle-
class home with all the “makings of a lawyer” (p. 12). As Ashton proudly describes, while he 
was in high school, he was captain of his High-Q team and a member of the drama club, 
performing alongside the Angela Bassett, who was only a year behind him (p. 13). Baez’s 
Otherness – his racialised status – is accentuated by the fact that he received his GED 
diploma after much struggle, served in the United States Navy, and later attended a 
community college, prior to attending law school where he was just a “C” student; these 
minor accomplishments stand in stark contrast to Ashton’s completion of a J.D. degree in 
two and a half years (p. 188). This illustration reinforces common perceptions of whites as 





incompetent and poorly educated. Moreover, in his thirty years as a prosecuting lawyer, 
Ashton had taken seventy homicide cases to trial and all but two returned guilty verdicts; 
he also prosecuted twelve death penalty cases and won convictions in all of them (p. 10).  
Baez, on the other hand, was a “rookie lawyer,” as the media referred to him, with 
an office in what was described as a “strip mall” (Baez, 2013, p. 57–58). He was a “man of 
rather pedestrian accomplishments,” argued Ashton (2012), “with precious little 
experience or knowledge to back up his [unearned] swagger” (p. 188). Compared to 
Ashton’s “solid” record of – “twenty-eight years of service, an unblemished record, and a 
near-perfect conviction rate” – Baez’s experience was rather inadequate; indeed, Ashton 
was “the go-to man,” even “doing trials that [he] was way over-qualified for” (p. 11–12). In 
contrast, Baez’s “paralegal/investigator role was where he got his exaggerated trial 
experience” (p. 189). Here, the very mention of the word “exaggerated” becomes code for 
“unqualified,” “under-accomplished,” and “inferior,” and operates in ways to negate the 
expertise and accomplishments of Baez and further reinscribe him as Other, thereby 
making it difficult to view him on an equal footing. To Ashton, “there are many lawyers who 
I’ve done battle with in court, but when we step out of the courtroom, we are friends. Baez 
was not one of them” (p. 189). This type of racial coding, in support of critical race theory, 
sustains white supremacy and plays an essential role in the establishment and 
maintenance of racial inequalities (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). By positioning Baez as the Other, 
Ashton was demarcated by a “pervasive pollution ideology through which white, middle- 
and working-class Americans evaluate the behaviours and opinions” of Others whereby 





1997c, p. 319). In the end, Ashton’s characterisation of Baez serves as a reminder of the 
unwilling co-mingling between white and racialised bodies in America.  
As I have argued in this section, Ashton’s socio-raced positioning reiterates white 
racial sentiments towards racialised bodies – especially those “invading” white spaces and 
institutions. The racial coding of Baez, especially in comparison to Ashton and his superior 
white status, further sustains white hegemony. We also see the attempts made by the 
prosecution to reduce or obscure Casey’s white privilege based in part on her affiliation 
with Baez – which only amplified her inferior status. The prosecution’s narration 
emphasises the potential “rubbing off” of Baez’s inferior status onto the body of Casey; 
keeping her at a distance from whiteness – thus reducing her status as a legitimate white 
person and further attempting to restrain her claims to white privilege.  
Defence Narrative 
McIntosh (1988) sets out to show that whiteness is not simply about abstract privilege, but 
to be (read as) white means, literally, to have a birthright to a broad array of policies and 
practices employed for one’s benefit and through which that privilege is enacted in the 
most subtle and mundane ways. McIntosh describes this constellation of raced privilege 
and white advantage as an “invisible knapsack” – something that white people carry 
around and use unthinkingly (McIntosh, 1998). According to Frankenberg (1993), 
whiteness has multiple dimensions: whiteness is a location of “structural advantage, of race 
privilege”; it is a standpoint from which white people look at “ourselves, at [racialised] 
others, and at society”; and it relies on a set of cultural practices that are typically unnamed. 





understandings of race (p. 22). This set of practices is the point of origin from which I 
situate my understanding of mobilised whiteness in the defence’s narrative.  
 
Enforcing Whiteness: Casey Anthony and her White, Middle-class Family 
The Anthony family epitomised true Americanness and newsworthiness, for they were the 
image of what the public liked to see and read about; this partly explains why Caylee’s story 
seized the interest of many Americans for three years. This nuclear, suburban, white, 
middle-class family is a popular staple of the American dream. The Anthonys lived in a two-
hundred-and-fifty thousand dollar "typical middle-class home … it was impeccably kept. 
Nothing was out of place, and it was spotlessly clean;” in addition, the family owned three 
or four vehicles (Baez, 2013, p. 28). George, the father, was described as a “well-built man 
… with a full shock of neatly kept white hair”, and Cindy, Casey’s mother, was portrayed as 
“middle-aged, tanned, blonde … intelligent and strong-willed” (p. 1–2). These identifiers 
were used to “soften” and whiten the image of Casey’s parents and were attempts to 
emphasise their similarity to the model white, American family in the United States. 
Descriptors such as “well-built,” “white hair,” “tanned,” “blonde,” and “intelligent” help us 
recognise the parents’ white status and what it means to be a respected and privileged 
white family in America. Like Casey, the Anthony family was not familiar with the criminal 
justice system: they had no prior criminal records, they contributed to society as 
upstanding citizens, and they did not ask nor expect much from the community (p. 75). The 
Anthonys appeared to be an all-American family: mother and father, older brother and 





McIntosh (1998) argues that whites continually benefit from “inherited systems of 
system over-advantage;” that is, a system exists that gives advantages, opportunities, 
rights, and liberties to white people. An articulation of a white privileging system speaks to 
us when defence counsel described Casey as a “girl [who] could have been anything she 
wanted to be in life” and whose writing was more intelligently crafted than what a 
“seasoned lawyer” could have produced, but “instead she’s here in jail and in the running for 
Most Hated Person in America” (Baez, 2013, p. 50, emphasis in original). We can extract the 
raced undertones in this passage: whiteness implies “knowledge,” “opportunity,” and 
“liberty.” This statement tells us that Casey is a white woman with wisdom, plentiful 
opportunities, and rights, and these rights and advantages ought to be acknowledged and 
respected. The relationship here between whiteness and societal advantage informs us that 
many doors open for certain people; anything that obstructs that sense of privilege, such as 
America’s hatred for Casey, is perceived as something that simply cannot be; it is a 
malfunction, a “hiccup,” or a violation of the system and what it was designated to do 
(McIntosh, 1988, p. 3). These are claims that could not have been (easily) made about 
Casey if she were not a white woman. The fact that Baez, a lawyer himself, enlightens us on 
the wisdom of a “seasoned lawyer” to describe Casey’s intelligence suggests that Casey, as a 
white woman, rightfully deserves all opportunities and advantages because of who she is.  
Unlike a lot of young, single, unemployed, and especially racialised, mothers, Casey 
had access to her friends’ homes, their cars, and bank books, and she was able to enter 
nightclubs whilst assisting and promoting the club venues. Her access to elite spaces of 
white, middle-class life (i.e., vehicles, homes, jobs, bank accounts, and the “nightlife”) and 





had an undisputed right to go anywhere and do anything if she chose. In essence, no doors 
shut her out. Not only did Casey have access to those items, she was able to freely use and 
enjoy them for her own benefit without difficulty. Casey remained unmarked from 
accessing items and spaces that would be prohibited to, say, a poor black man, since the 
marking and over-policing of a black man denies him access and results in his static and 
immobilised body. Of Casey’s twenty-plus friends and acquaintances called to testify during 
the trial, most were white professionals and/or university students. This portrait tells us 
that while Casey was neither a “professional” nor a “student”, her class and raced standing 
and her access to resources welcomed those individuals into her life – she was associated, 
had access to, and identified with race and class privilege, even if she alone did not conform 
to the middle-class script. So while we see that whiteness granted Casey with a particular 
type of privilege, in a novel way, classed-whiteness worked to magnify that privilege. 
 
Treating Whiteness as the Human Ordinary 
Often in racialised scripts, descriptors or references to cultural or ethnic practices or 
behaviours are used to denote Otherness – to make it clear that one is dealing with “those 
who are not like us.” The same philosophy affirms how whites often use tropes of sameness 
to frame the white narrative – to reaffirm a universal interpretation and cultural 
understandings of whiteness as “there and everywhere.” Baez (2013) articulated race in a 
very subtle way at Casey’s bond hearing. With a vision of exonerating the defendant, Baez 
urged the judge to “treat her like anyone else … she’s not a danger to anyone” (p. 44). A 
criminal, in popular discourse, is not one that resembles the people closest to “us” (i.e., 





reminds us, white women are hardly ever constituted as a threat and thus no cause for 
moral panic or concern gets attributed to the “province of whiteness” (p. 155). Because 
white people are not threatening and do not activate the same fearful reactions that black 
or racialised people do, only a white person can be treated “like anyone else” because he or 
she is “not a danger.” We do not commonly refer to racialised people “like anyone else,” as 
we do not attribute a racialised face to represent universality, normativity, and the human 
collectivity. Nor are we hesitant to accept that “those people” are not inherently dangerous. 
Indeed, the core of white privilege here is the ability to be seen and treated as “human” and 
as “individual” in a white-dominated society. Referred to in this way, Casey remains 
invisible and unmarked, similar to white people described in discourses of whiteness who 
rightfully claim their universal status. As long as Casey is invisible, she remains “like us.” It 
is within this same narrative that Baez (2013), despite the obvious racial differences 
between himself and Casey, was still able to see her as a sort of daughter figure and 
maintain a state of fatherly protection over her. Drawing heavily on ideologies of whiteness 
in concert with dominant discourses of masculinity, patriarchy, and perhaps hetero-sexism, 
Baez believed that if Casey had been his own daughter “there’s no way I wouldn’t fall on my 
sword for [her]” (p. 190). That Casey could be regarded in that way speaks to her 
privileged, universal position of “sameness.” 
 The more the prosecution attempted to make Casey vulnerable to conviction, the 
more defence counsel had a strategic recourse for her whiteness; through their narrative, 
we see their eager and successful attempts to whiten her. The endeavour most certainly 
came as no easy task, as most Americans publicly scrutinised him (and her); had Baez been 





whiteness would have seemed more natural to his identification as a privileged white man. 
His association with Casey would have resembled a daughter-father relationship and 
would have shown Casey to be in company with “good” people of her own race. As a 
Hispanic man, as we understand in popular discourses, his voice is not necessarily given 
the currency and significance that is commonly attributed to the white voice. Whiteness 
from the defence’s standpoint is deployed to protect Casey and to neither exclude nor 
marginalise her.  
A fierce battle ensued between the prosecution and defence as the defence heavily 
argued Casey’s “sameness,” demanding that she be treated like “one of our own” by arguing 
her innocence – that “she’s the mother of a missing child, and she’s someone’s daughter, 
and she’s human” (p. 88). This strategy was promoted within the context of white 
supremacy and in a manner that maximised racial sameness. “Mother,” “daughter,” 
“human” are strong codified words that stand in for whiteness and are meant to help us 
“connect the dots” about white females – so that treating them like “one of our own” 
appears natural and common sense for us. Similar to the discourses used by the 
prosecution to humanise Caylee and underscore her whiteness, the same tactic was 
employed by Baez to emphasise Casey’s whiteness. It might have been easier to relate to 
Casey as a figure of empathy if she was viewed as a white American, as the mother of a 
white missing child, and possibly as America’s (i.e., the jury’s) daughter.  
 White people continue to be in a distinct majority position; like most social arenas 
and institutions in North America, the legal sphere and the jury, specifically in this case, 
hold true to this account and are controlled and dominated by whites. Dyer (1997) agrees 





criminal justice and legal systems, as they occupy the central positions in these major 
entities. These systems work to protect white people and make white understandings 
normative, since most of the decision-makers are white. The same whites that rendered a 
not-guilty verdict for Casey. This unnamed, structural advantage of white people ensures 
that they will be in the presence of an overwhelming and powerful majority who are, by the 
same token, white. Constructing Casey as a person of our “kind” (i.e., as a white person) 
tells us that she too can be normalised, humanised, and, ultimately, deemed innocent 
because white females have the benefit of appearing virtuous and credible even when they 
are altogether unknown to us (Madriz, 1997; Stabile, 2006; Parrott & Parrott, 2015). 
Furthermore, white people can enter social spaces/environments that “protect” them and, 
more often than not, they have the benefit of facing “peers” of their race (McIntosh, 1998; 
Alexander, 2012, p. 194). As Russell-Brown (2006) states, “as a group white Americans do 
not have to act as black Americans do to protect their own – the justice system does it for 
them” (p. 6). Facing a jury of her peers (literally, her peers) gave Casey the ability to 
exercise her white privilege to a community in which she finds herself included. Casey was 
served in a public venue that, by and large, privileges people (that are, and look) like her. 
That Casey stood on trial before a jury comprised of ten whites and two blacks, seven 
women and five men, bestowed on her a skin-colour and gender advantage; it might have 
been difficult for the jury to convict Casey based on system over-privilege. 
Under white supremacy, Americans have been taught to regulate their negative 
projections away from white bodies, trained to be kind to white people, and socialised to 
believe and favour white (female) faces. We openly subscribe to that dominant racial, 





explained: “I believed Casey. It was a unique moment between the two of us. I had a gut 
feeling she was telling me the truth” about not knowing the whereabouts of Caylee (p. 34). 
Here is a representation of the power of the white voice to not only be heard but more 
significantly to be legitimised and deemed reliable and credible. The words, voices, and 
testimonies of white females are viewed as gospel (Stabile, 2006, p. 164). At least 
implicitly, the defence drew attention to Casey as a deserving and legitimate woman by 
making her whiteness central to that characterisation.  
It is no wonder this case became so widely publicised; it is unusual to see an 
attractive white woman charged with murder, especially of her own child, but it is even 
more uncommon to have the public vilify her for it. And, though Casey was publicly 
criticised almost every day for three years by law enforcement, the media, and the 
prosecution, we can be almost certain that her race did not work against her. A racialised 
defendant would not have shared that same benefit or luxury of being unmarked in that 
way. Surely a racialised defendant would have his (or her) race to speak for in connection 
with the crime he (or she) allegedly committed.   
 
Caylee Anthony and the Anthony Family as Apparatuses of White Privilege 
Prior to Caylee being found dead, “all the national TV shows came calling” (Baez, 2013, p. 
36). The disparity between how white victims are treated in mainstream news compared 
to the overall dismissal of black victims is astounding (Stabile, 2006, p. 1). People magazine, 
a widely-known and reputable “tabloid” magazine, did a full article, including a front page 
cover-spread, with details of the investigation as it was underway in the hopes of enlisting 





several charity organisations for support, many news agencies set the reward for finding 
Caylee at $225,000 – which was reportedly half of Casey’s bail (Baez, 2013). Byrne (2006) 
reminds us that white individuals and particularly white victims play a central role in 
articulating national identity so that we know exactly who these “victims” are by name and 
face. Moreover, during closing arguments, Baez reiterated that it was “such a difficult thing 
for you to push aside. Caylee was a beautiful, sweet, innocent child who died too soon” (p. 
391). Language often works to mask privilege so that references to beauty and innocence 
do not need to explicitly mention ideologies about gender and race; nevertheless, the 
hierarchy implicit in words such as “beautiful,” “sweet,” “innocent,” and “child” signify that 
Caylee was a deserving and worthy white victim who needed the support of many across 
the United States. Caylee, as a “beautiful” child, was spoken about at great lengths, further 
illustrating and cementing her whiteness and the genuineness of her victim-status (p. 392). 
This illustration of white privilege can be linked to Caylee’s status as a deserving white 
victim, thereby making her mother “deserving” as well. So, while Casey was not perceived 
to be a “victim” by the general American public, her “beautiful, dead white” child garnered 
tremendous support and sensitivity from across the nation that consequentially included 
Casey in that “deserving victim” bracket (Stabile, 2006, p. 17). As a “darling,” innocent child 
(Baez, 2013, p. 193), Caylee’s whiteness acted in the service of Casey’s own white status 
and thereby her innocence.19 Because the media viewed Caylee as a victim, she was able to 
“lend” her whiteness and unquestionably her white privilege to her mother.  
                                                             
19 Caylee was able to “whiten” her mother quite effortlessly, a task that would not have come so easily had Caylee been a 
biracial child. Caylee’s biraced-ness would have been a reminder (and an embodiment) of Casey’s identification with black 





The Anthony family was also able to invest in their white privilege by positively 
representing Caylee since white victims, as Stabile (2006) reminds us, “provide one of the 
most emotional and effective representational modes for mobilizing sympathy” (p. 2). The 
Anthony family secured a spot on all the major national television shows, including Nancy 
Grace on HLN, Geraldo at Large and On the Record with Greta van Susteren on Fox News, 
and also Larry King Live to garner attention for the young child. Casey’s mother also went 
to visit Meredith Viera to discuss the goings-on of the case. As Stabile (2006) demonstrates, 
white supremacy is inherently “built into the very bricks of … commercial news” (p. 4). All 
of the Anthonys’ meals, accommodations, and transportation were provided for them, and 
they were able to raise a considerable amount of money to assist with the search for Caylee. 
Notably, Casey was paid up to $200,000 from a national news organisation for the sale of 
her daughter’s photos. Counsel later stated that most of it was used for her legal costs and 
to acquire the proper professionals to mount their defence. This powerful and remarkable 
deployment of whiteness is buttressed by Baez’s testimony:  
One of the networks wanted to fly me up to do an interview and meet its executive. 
I was using the trip to build a defence team on the media’s dime … I realized that this 
case was going to be expensive to defend and I had to be creative and use the media 
to my advantage. And that’s exactly what I did. Each and every time I did an 
interview in New York or someplace else, I used the trip to see and work with my 
experts and build a defense. (p. 51, emphasis mine) 
 
Baez and Casey were able to secure some of the most distinguished experts in the field to 
help with the case, one of whom was Dr. Henry Lee, forensic scientist and one of the “stars” 
of the O. J. Simpson murder case who was “kind enough to sign onto the case for [only] a 
$5,000 donation to his institute” (p. 92). Dr. Lee also testified and assisted in the John F. 





What is more, charity organisations offered five thousand dollars to criminal lawyer Mark 
NeJame for his aid in assisting and representing the Anthonys throughout the course of the 
case.  
Casey’s mother and father benefitted from Caylee’s white status as well and were 
treated to dinners at five-star restaurants and stays at swanky hotels such as The Ritz-
Carlton Orlando “on the media’s dime while crime scene investigators were on their hands 
and knees in the rain searching the woods for their granddaughter’s bones” (Baez, 2013, p. 
120). Adding to that, the steady current of funds, and reportedly $20,000 from CBS for 
obtaining photographs of Casey and her daughter, allowed both Cindy and George to go on 
a “lavish cruise” without spending a penny to save their daughter who was facing the death 
penalty, unlike Baez’s other clients, some of whom were “migrant farmworkers who 
[didn’t] have a decent place to live” (p. 171). Casey had even “received donations from 
people who were outraged over how unfairly she was being treated” (p. 231). So while 
Casey did not have money herself, she was always able to access it when required and 
always able to deploy white privilege when most needed. According to Baez: 
It’s a darn good thing Casey was able to do this. Without that money, we wouldn’t 
have been able to do a lot of the things we needed to do to fight her case. Without 
that money, we would not have been able to hire the experts that were needed to 
mount a viable defense against the barrage coming at us from the police, the 
prosecution, and the media. (p. 77) 
 
These examples reiterate how white privilege and the ongoing protection of white 
femininity were manifested through Casey’s (and her daughter’s) raced and gendered 
identification. Casey’s ability to secure help and acquire money through her relation to her 
family, and most certainly her daughter, was a deployment of white power in itself. Casey, 





gateway to these benefits was offered through collective inheritances that she ultimately 
received as being part of a recognisably privileged group.  
 Stabile (2006) explains that the “consistence and historical continuity” with which 
the media decides which group of persons count as “victims” informs us that the relation 
between white victims and “worthy victims,” which have long excluded black individuals, is 
quite profound and reflective of the white supremacist society in which we live (p. 1–3). 
Casey was able to benefit in many ways because of her white privilege; Caylee, as a victim, 
also benefitted from white privilege. During the quest to locate Caylee’s body, despite the 
fact that many individuals volunteered their time and efforts with many organisations to 
assist with the search, “each volunteer had to pay twenty-five dollars. A lot of people joined 
… the searchers were good people who were just concerned about Caylee and wanted to 
find her” (p. 99). It was an effortless venture to invite the media in “to get word out that 
Caylee was missing” (p. 34). Some of the principal investigators in this case claimed that 
“they were going to launch the biggest search in [United States] history”; more than 
thirteen hundred volunteers devoted their time and energies to locate the missing white 
child – one man in particular, who followed the case religiously on the television and over 
the internet, offered his services for free to the Anthony family (p. 103). Such examples 
reiterate how Casey benefitted from the victim-status of her missing child; as she was 
Caylee’s mother, she literally profited from all of the support. The dead child’s white status 
had a cash value. Representations of white victims affect us beyond mere publicity; the 
emotional responses we render to white victims radiates from deep within us. In a way, we 





means that we deny their victim-statuses and, most importantly, their statuses as white 
people.  
 White people can be self-assured that, when the public needs to be informed, one 
can turn on the television or open the front page of the paper and see people of their race 
widely represented (McIntosh, 1988, p. 2). Countless reports of Caylee being the front-page 
headliner throughout the summer are described in both the prosecution and defence’s 
narrative. Caylee’s (and Casey’s) story even attracted the interest of former Los Angeles 
Police Department Detective, Mark Fuhrman, the “star witness” against O. J. Simpson in his 
murder trial, who “found” the bloody glove and was accused of being a racist when tapes 
emerged of him uttering “Nigger.” In addition to Fuhrman‘s interest in the case, Casey’s 
story appealed to Geraldo Rivera, who had covered the O. J. Simpson case and “had done 
battle with defence attorney Johnnie Cochran” making Cochran’s life “difficult” (p. 60). 
What is profound about the translation of white privilege in this episode is that Geraldo 
offered counsel, and made Baez privy to, “some of the mistakes that Cochran made, 
warning [him] not to make the same mistakes” (p. 60). This support for Baez, and even 
more for Casey, was essential as it truly helped the defendant’s case; whenever things 
became unbearable or unpredictable, “[Baez] always remembered Geraldo’s words” (p. 
60). 
In her analysis of national media responses to white and black victims, McCants 
Lewis (2013) supports Stabile’s (2006) argument by highlighting the “media storm … when 
a white person is reported as being kidnapped, missing or murdered, [while] the death of 
black children is often ignored” (p. 156). Reports of endangered white people are at the 





granddaughter, has captivated the world” (Ashton, 2012, p. 77). So while the narrative of 
Casey had already begun and the story for Caylee had abruptly ended, Baez firmly declared 
that “Caylee had so quickly become a huge part of my life, and I didn’t even know her,” and 
while being a lawyer requires one not to be emotional, “I am not, however, bulletproof” (p. 
118–21). In Baez’s narrative, Casey and arguably her daughter never lost their statuses as 
white people/females.  
 
The “Whitening” of Mother and Daughter by Cindy Anthony 
In both the defence and the prosecution narratives we see the lending of whiteness by 
Cindy to her daughter and her granddaughter. The role of Cindy in this story is quite 
significant and is further discussed in this section.  
George and Cindy became Caylee’s public face while Casey was awaiting bail, and 
campaigned for the search for Caylee and the innocence of their daughter. However, even if 
Casey was there assisting her parents with the public search, her presence as the white 
mother would have been neither threatening nor problematic. Furthermore, Cindy’s role as 
the white (grand)mother served both Caylee and Casey. Cindy fought hard for her daughter 
and granddaughter, even working to maintain the innocence of her daughter regardless of 
her doubts about Casey’s parenting choices (Ashton, 2012, p. 240). This whitening of her 
daughter extended to the point where Cindy perjured herself on the stand to protect Casey 
when she stated that she searched for chlorophyll (or chloroform?) on the home computer, 
despite her work records indicating otherwise. As Baez later explained, “You can certainly 
say what she was doing was lying to protect [her daughter] … maybe she was trying to save 





imprisonment, by lying under oath before the jury in order to cast her daughter as a victim. 
And as a mature, white woman in a respected profession, Cindy mobilised white privilege 
in service of her quest 
 During the initial introduction of Cindy when the first police officer arrived at the 
family home, she was described by prosecuting counsel as a woman with “short blondish 
hair … she was pale, her blue eyes bloodshot and swollen” (Ashton, 2012, p. 26). 
References to her “blondish hair,” “pale” skin, and “blue eyes” are racially-insinuating, 
telling us that Cindy is white. Racial coding was thus employed to activate our sincere 
sentiments towards this white, middle-class woman. Cindy, a recognised professional and 
white woman, was first to inform law enforcement of Caylee’s disappearance; therefore, 
she brought Caylee into the conversation, and by keeping Caylee in the conversation (i.e., in 
front of the media), she gave the little girl a name, a face, and a “voice.” Having Cindy 
present and publicly advocating for Caylee meant that the child could be identified, 
recognised, and sympathised.  
Cindy’s response to Casey’s behaviours was often ambivalent, and many reports 
suggested that tensions existed between Cindy and her daughter. She initially was furious 
with Casey for stealing money, lying about being employed, and being irresponsible as a 
mother; however, during Casey’s bond hearing, “Cindy was far more protective and 
defensive” of Casey, stating that: “I know Casey as a person. I know what she is as a mother 
… I believe … someone is holding [something] over her and threatening her in some way” 
(Ashton, 2012, p. 63). Cindy’s denial and “change of course” was odd given the 
circumstances of her relationship with her daughter; however, it further reinforced Casey’s 





the claims of Casey being a loving mother was an area where a more complete and 
candid testimony from Cindy could have been really beneficial. As Cindy’s 
coworkers had shown in our interviews with them, Cindy had her doubts about 
Casey as a mother. Because these interviews were based in hearsay and therefore 
inadmissible, Cindy alone had the power to show this to the jury … we might have 
been able to use Cindy’s testimony to make a stronger case for Casey as an 
irresponsible parent with more of a motive for murdering her daughter. (Ashton, 
2012, p. 316)  
 
In one incident, a woman criticised Casey by calling her a “bitch,” and Cindy responded: “if 
you call [her] a bitch again…” thereby making her fight for her daughter not just 
metaphorical but possibly even more literal (Baez, 2013, p. 83).  
 Prior to Caylee’s body being found, Cindy was determined to believe that Casey 
“was only lying and holding back to protect Caylee’s life” and she continued to believe her, 
even floating a new possibility of Caylee’s whereabouts to the media and to law 
enforcement, but she “never offered any possibilities of real substance” (Ashton, 2012, p. 
65–66). Ever in denial, when reports identified the remains of a child found a block from 
the family home, “apparently she thought there was another missing child who no one had 
reported missing on that corner, as insane as that may have sounded” (Baez, 2013, p. 120). 
Moreover, in spite of the evidence that Casey was a liar, Cindy “was unreceptive to either 
the possibility of Caylee being dead or her daughter having any role in that matter” 
(Ashton, 2012, p. 140). The remains in fact was that of little Caylee. 
 Even after the discovery of Caylee’s body, Cindy never attributed guilt to Casey and 
was always steadfast in her belief that Casey did not (and could not) commit such a 
heinous act. When the trial was over, Cindy (alongside George) gave an interview with Dr. 
Phil McGraw in which she continued to defend her daughter by suggesting that Casey might 





her ability to discern reality from fiction. Dr. McGraw notes Cindy’s ability to trivialise 
events and situations. Cindy was “as rooted in her denial as ever” (Ashton, 2012, p. 321); 
this could suggest that Cindy was subconsciously attempting to make her daughter more 
secure in her white victim status by “painting an idealistic picture of Casey as a mother” in 
addition to criticising investigators for persecuting her daughter (Ashton, 2012, p. 268). As 
far as Cindy was concerned, “yes, Caylee was dead, but their daughter didn’t do it … [the 
Anthonys] were still of the opinion that a stranger had killed their precious angel” (Ashton, 
2012, p. 178). According to Ashton, Cindy and her daughter were purportedly the “best of 
friends” as Cindy’s (deceptive) narrative went, so that when she claimed in her deposition 
that “the night before Caylee went missing, the three of them curled up on the sofa together 
to watch TV”, it seemed convincing (p. 178).  
Because of who she was, Cindy had considerable power to appear credible by 
enforcing whiteness and advancing white privilege before the jury. Cindy was not willing to 
deny the sympathies and benefits owed to her daughter and granddaughter. Doing so 
would indicate that Caylee was not a worthy white child and that Casey is not a good white 
mother. By having access to white privilege, Cindy was able to justify both Caylee and 
Casey’s white feminine statuses based largely through racial and gender ideology.  
 
Conclusion 
The recourse to Casey’s status as an inferior woman tells us that her white body remains a 
clear, logical portrait of a privileged body within popular discourse. The American legal 
system worked well (or simply, it worked) in Casey’s favour – reinforcing white superiority 





Casey’s white privilege remained dominant – as the mother of a worthy white child, the 
daughter of respected white parents, and the recipient of the white privileging media. 
Consequently, Casey’s whiteness provided her with innumerable benefits that consistently 




[7] Contradicting Discourses: Femaleness 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses and interprets the conflicting narratives produced by the 
prosecution and defence as they pertain to Casey’s white femininity. It includes an 
explanation of Casey’s femininity as it was negotiated by counsels in order to pinpoint how 
feminine standards are not only reflective of gendered identities, but also very much race-
specific.  
 Batacharya (2010) writes that “femininity” is a “racial contract” integral to 
colonialism and white supremacy (p. 44). Proper femininity, Batacharya argues, has 
depended on white women as being “guardians of [bourgeois] morality” (p. 44). By the 
same token, the category of “normal femininity” is based on a generic construction of 
womanhood which refers to a female subject who is white and heterosexual (Barak et al., 
2010), “inherently weaker than men, needy of protection” (Stabile, 2006, p. 155), who can 
maintain a petite stature, is passive and non-aggressive, and has a body that “can and does 
attract the attention of boys and young men” (Jiwani, 2010, p. 120). Jiwani (2010) explains 
that the notion of femaleness emphasises (and carries with it connotations of) thinness, 
beauty, sexuality, and a “certain look.” A feminine body is a “delicate, white, Anglo” body, 
one that seems to “fit … like the girl next door,” argues Byers (2009, p. 43). Equally, the 
feminine body remains “gentled,” of a “fragile nature,” and only attainable by those girls 
and young women whose identities are truly legitimised (Byers, 2009, p. 50).  
 The attempts to discursively construct Casey’s white femininity (or lack thereof) by 
legal counsel reiterate raced standards of “gender” executed throughout the body. Either 





women embodying certain characteristics and shows a concern for different ways of 
negotiating or resisting those feminine characterisations.  
Prosecutorial Narrative 
Casey’s guilt was argued based, in large part, on her resistance to embody (proper) white 
femininity. Throughout the trial, Casey was often referenced, though implicitly, as un-
feminine despite several descriptions of her as “young,” a very gentling characteristic. 
From the onset of their narrative, the prosecution set out to prove that the defendant was 
impenitent, highly promiscuous, and vicious, conventional traits that are not commonly 
used in discoursing white womanhood.  
 
Casey Anthony’s Maternity on Trial 
 The prosecution raised grave concerns about Casey’s lack of emotional expression during 
the course of the case. Unlike most mothers who experience a tragic event, such as the 
disappearance or death of their child, Casey did not exhibit the appropriate emotional 
responses that Ashton believed would/should constitute grief; her behaviour from the 
onset continued to be the "polar opposite of frantic … no sense of panic, just … a dash of 
annoyance" (Ashton, 2012, p. 21). In fact, when Casey told her brother and mother that 
Caylee was missing, her “story stayed calmly consistent” as she “sat stone-faced, not 
revealing anything” (Ashton, 2012, p. 27–28). That she appeared to be so calloused was 
enough evidence to construct her as a criminal. The prosecution argued that Casey acted 
out of concern for her own welfare, uninterested in anything that was neither self-serving 
nor self-promoting; this reduced her credibility and made her appear less moral and 





 Casey’s inability to express the necessary emotions of a grieving and distraught 
mother contradicted what most would expect from a mother who suddenly lost her child. 
In fact, for Ashton, “Casey didn’t seem like someone who cared about … her daughter” (p. 
45). When Casey spoke of Caylee, her tone contradicted her “words of concern” and her 
answers remained “flat and unembellished” (p. 30). Even more, Ashton noticed that there 
was a “sense of relief in Casey’s voice when she realised the interview with the detective 
was drawing to a close” during the initial investigation (p. 48). The fact that a woman’s 
emotions (i.e., the visibility of her tears) is such a determining factor emphasising true 
motherhood is structured around the discourse of hegemonic white maternity, which is 
commonly expected of all white mothers. Casey’s obvious lack of emotion “combined with 
her actions, [showed] that the most important thing to Casey was Casey” (Ashton, 2012, p. 
79). Casey failed to make the sacrifice that all American white mothers must be, or should 
be, willing to make; she was neither selfless nor maternal. As a result, her femaleness was 
challenged in a society where a display of our most sincere feelings extend outward to 
children. 
In Casey’s world, you didn’t call 911 when your child drowns … you didn’t 
frantically bring your child to the hospital to try and revive her … you didn't grieve 
for weeks and months on end. Instead, you stuffed your little girl in a laundry bag, 
threw her in a swamp, and went out partying with your new boyfriend. (Ashton, 
2012, p. 306) 
 
As the above passage demonstrates, the arguments presented by the prosecution centred 
on critiquing Casey’s maternal instincts. According to Ashton, “she did not cry or give any 
indication that she was legitimately worried” about her child (p. 48). This behaviour was 
indicative of her role as a bad mother who did not have the civility to properly mourn the 





The reality of Casey’s strange behaviour was further supported by Dr. Jan 
Garavaglia, a chief medical examiner, who pointed out that “in all the records of drowning 
children, in one hundred percent of the cases, rescue was called. ‘No matter how stiff that 
body is, [mothers] always call 911 in the hopes that the child could be saved’” (as cited in 
Ashton, 2012, p. 278). As a result, Ashton was “left incredulous by Casey’s reaction,” 
questioning whether “it was even possible for a loving, caring parent to take that long to 
report a missing child” (p. 22). The prosecution reported that “her behaviour did not reflect 
how a mother would react to the 'accidental' death of her child" (p. 303). Regardless of 
Casey’s reasons for not reporting her daughter missing, the prosecution claimed that “her 
failure to do anything to find her child would have constituted child abuse … Casey was, at 
the very least, guilty of neglect” (p. 49). The prosecution believed that “Casey took no 
responsibility whatsoever” for what happened to Caylee, and “that was always her 
position” (p. 208). Arguably, Casey’s guilt, as it was outlined, preceded her child’s death and 
began the moment she failed as a mother by not notifying authorities of her daughter’s 
disappearance: a crime in and of itself. A woman is believed to possess emotional and 
sympathetic qualities so that she would at least contact authorities in the event that 
something was truly wrong. The absence of Casey’s emotions effectively labelled her as 
morally flawed, a woman who disobeyed the fundamental requirements of femininity.  
 One of the few times that Casey actually displayed emotion during the trial was 
when George adamantly dismissed getting rid of Caylee’s body, to which “Casey was 
shaking her head and rolling her eyes, directing her theatrics at the jury. She glanced at her 
father only long enough to cast him a glare” (p. 257). Casey was an unsympathetic, unfit 





properly caring for her child (Ashton, 2012, p. 30). Since Casey did not conform or resort to 
conventional behaviours of motherhood, she was slandered in many different ways, 
particularly for being concerned with only “myyyyy boyfriend” (p. 267). In a reported 
incident when Casey spoke with Cindy, “Casey lamented about her disappointment with 
[Lazzaro], who had not come to visit her in jail [and] her ex-fiancé [who] was also on her 
bad side” (p. 74).  
 As the prosecution described it, “even as everyone worried about her daughter, 
Casey seemed more preoccupied with trying to sustain her fledgling relationship” with 
men, and was unmoved by the waning connection with her family; as Ashton put it, “her 
sense of priorities was baffling” (p. 55). In the end, “this only added to the portrait of her as 
callous and uncaring” (p. 55). Taken together, these reflections created a very telling sketch 
of “where her thoughts were as her daughter was missing with presumably the entire 
Orlando area looking for her” (p. 51). In Walker and Filia’s text (2011), Shultz argues that 
“Casey’s casual demeanor and detached statements as well as her party lifestyle while her 
child was missing are indicative of someone who has a callous and unstable nature i.e., not 
the normal grief pattern experienced by a mother who has lost her beloved child” (p. 520). 
The evidence offered by counsel created a narrative that seemed unlikely of a white 
woman: that Casey planned to begin a new life without Caylee. The prosecution firmly 
maintained that Casey “knowingly and consciously” engaged in these behaviours so as "to 
live the 'beautiful life,' and the only problem was the beautiful life did not include a two-
year-old daughter" (p. 304). The fact that she was now living a good life independent of 





She got a tattoo expressing … a beautiful life … She blamed her daughter’s 
disappearance on a babysitter who did not exist … There was no scenario we could 
imagine in which a mom could experience the accidental death of her child and then 
proceed to drive around with the dead body in her trunk, watch a movie, and spend 
the night with her new boyfriend. Those did not seem like the actions of someone 
whose daughter had died in a freak and tragic accident. (128–29) 
 
The construction of femininity as dependent on vivid and publicly displayed emotions 
creates a firm boundary within which a good white woman is produced, lest she not be 
considered feminine. Women (mothers) cry. Therefore, because Casey did not cry, she 
could not be read as a good white woman. Through this narrative, the prosecution 
challenged a set of very conservative and static definitions of femininity that continue to 
define and structure our cultural views of white femininity and womanhood. 
 
The Avail(able) Trashed Body 
Casey’s body was a telling indicator of her lifestyle choices, which, by default, allowed for 
discussions about her deviant ways and over-sexualisation, as well as her alleged 
involvement in the murder of her daughter. Caylee’s body portrayed (if not unleashed) a 
deviant sexual force. The prosecution publically marked Casey’s body and specifically made 
it an object of inquiry by noting what she wore and how she offered and used her body with 
men. When Ashton described the day that Caylee was last seen, he made a concerted effort 
to note that Casey and Lazzaro “watched a video, went to bed, and – wink-wink – didn’t 
leave the bedroom until late the next day” (p. 83). Her body, as a legible text, became part of 
a discourse on normative raced-gendered behaviour so that her constructed perverse 
femininity would become more tangible for the jury and therefore make her more 





local grocery store to buy “lingerie, oversize white sunglasses … and a six-pack of Bud 
Light” (p. 93). The construction of Casey’s femininity became part of a “broader morality 
tale” about what her body communicated and how it occupied its own space of “immoral 
privilege” (Byers, 2009, p. 43). Pictures of her surfaced, including photos of her “peeing in 
public, and mooning one of her friends, her ass bare to the wind” (Baez, 2013, p. 228). 
There seemed to be little dispute over the fact that Casey had been enjoying a life of parties 
and wild adventures, and the prosecution used this photograph, amongst others, to confirm 
her unruly, tainted image in addition to using these images as part of the narrative through 
which Casey should be condemned. The prosecution brought up an incident where Casey 
attended an “anything but clothes” party the night before Caylee was last seen, and was 
described as wrapped in just an American flag and holding a beer, with no cares in the 
world (p. 242). Casey’s shortcomings as a mother, evidenced by her love of bars and boys, 
were persistently reflected in her irresponsible ways (p. 122).  
According to the prosecution, Casey simply could not get enough; she was always 
ready and able (available?). Even though for the defence, “the party photos had nothing to 
do with the murder of Caylee Anthony. Nothing,” Casey’s promiscuity was still heavily 
voiced by the prosecution (Baez, 2013, p. 318, emphasis in original). Casey’s sexually-loose 
ways were “manifest[ed] not only in her morals, but in her manner of speech and quite 
literally in the free and easy way she move[d]” (Bartky, 1997, p. 30). Her body was 
reflective of the trashed woman’s body that always lacks humanity and is therefore only 
property to be used and discarded. Casey was not only sexualised, but also vilified for the 





trashed woman is always “out there,” unable to be kept in its place for others to see and 
scrutinise.  
Casey’s body and femininity were highly scrutinised by the prosecution and the 
public, from images caught on video surveillance the day Caylee was last seen, to images of 
her in the nightclubs, and to her appearance during the trial. These were perhaps the most 
important elements put forward by the prosecution as they argued for Casey’s conviction. 
For instance, the prosecution noted on one occasion that Casey “wasn't wearing any 
makeup, and she had her puss on, lips pursed like she was annoyed and ready to rail into 
somebody” (Ashton, 2012, p. 247). The prosecution’s description suggests Casey’s 
appearance was a reflection of her resistance to femininity and a failed gender performance 
(i.e., she is not considered fully feminine) and etiquette. Casey was not genteel and 
sophisticated and, more importantly, not a model white woman – one who always looks 
and acts decent. “Beauty itself is white” (Harris, 2000, p. 269, emphasis in original); as such, 
a woman must always be “made up” and her beauty should always be offered, for if she 
does not comply, she is not a proper white woman.  
 One remarkable aspect of Casey’s body that generated much attention and criticism 
was the infamous tattoo, Bella Vita, that she received on the back of her left shoulder during 
the period when her daughter was missing (p. 90). The tattoo was a major part of the 
prosecution’s attempt to prove Casey’s guilt. According to Ashton, “the tattoo artist told the 
police that … Casey seemed happy when he met her, he assumed she was living a Bella Vita” 
(p. 91). The prosecution argued that “it was a verification of our theory and Casey’s most 
vivid expression of life without Caylee” (p. 257). The prosecution and the defence 





stating that it was a juxtaposed symbol to the good or normal life that Casey never had but 
always desired. However, most people, as it was reported in Ashton’s text and from 
discussions in the media, sided with the prosecution and believed it to be a strong and 
definitive sign of Casey’s guilt, a type of “badge” or statement celebrating a beautiful life 
without her child, and even more, without the responsibilities that a child brings (p. 280). 
Not only was her sexual behaviour closely monitored but the fact that her body could be so 
over-evaluated and scrutinised meant that Casey lost the right to privacy and ownership 
over her own (supposed white, female) body.  
 
Once Again: The Blue Dress is the Reason for Condemnation  
Respectability is deeply imbricated in constructions of race, gender, and sexuality; to attain 
a moral identity, one must conform to respectable and socially approved codes of white 
feminine behaviour (Seal, 2010, p. 63–4). Surprisingly, however, as an attractive female, 
Casey’s “looks” might have made her case all the more complex as her image and 
identification as a white woman are not commonly associated with criminality. In fact, 
white femininity and criminality are incompatible, mutually exclusive terms. Casey is a 
white female, yet her performance was distanced from conventional constructs of white 
femininity and innocence, and the prosecution highlighted this persistently so that she 
could not be the beneficiary of white feminine privilege – attempts that ultimately failed.  
Photos of Casey’s infamous, short blue dress and black calf-high boots worn at 
Fusion nightclub during a “Hot Body” contest four days after her daughter was reportedly 
last seen were widely publicised; these images substantiated claims about her white trash 





feminine norms of dress and behaviour: “[she] spent the evening showing off her body … 
grinding and dancing with others on the dance floor” (p. 86). Monica Lewinski’s sexual 
scandal with President Bill Clinton and her infamous blue dress, by the same token, 
reminds us that the trashed white body is unable to “stay in its proper place” (Byers, 2009, 
p. 42). The trashiness exuded throughout the body and shaped by the trope of 
uncontrollability is quite “legible not just in how our bodies look, but in what they do” 
(Byers, 2009, p. 42). Casey’s trashiness was “always hanging out”; to borrow a phrase from 
Garber (2001): “it became the cause behind the cause, the story behind the story” for the 
prosecution (p. 177). 
 Commenting on Casey’s body was a way to shame and condemn her inferior white 
female body – rendering guilt with or without criminal conviction. All of the characteristics 
of Casey’s body were presented within discourses of a deviant femininity, in opposition to 
orthodox lines depicting white womanhood. What Casey wore, the way she applied her 
makeup, the position of her lips, and the hairstyle she sported were all observed and 
reported by counsel, as if these were any significant indications of her guilt. Her 
(un)femininity was manifested in a style that was structured precisely on the betrayal of 
the chasteness that is grounded on the ideology of hegemonic white womanhood. The fact 
that Casey never disclosed, or did not know, who Caylee’s father was demonstrated that 
she was sexually out-of-control and overly-utilised (in terms of body) and proved her unfit 
as a good mother and as a respectable white woman. Based on this construction, Casey, in 
the end, became just an over-sexualised body for the prosecution. Her exposed perverse 
sexuality and lack of femininity, linked to discourses of promiscuity, prostitution, and 





provocative does not conform to white hegemony and therefore cannot, in the least, be a 
good white mother – and a proper white woman. In a way, Casey did very little to sacrifice 
her pleasures. These qualities were “evidence” of the prosecution’s claim and justified their 
pursuit of a first-degree murder charge.  
The prosecutorial narrative, at times, appeared less interested in Casey’s failure to 
report her daughter missing to authorities, and more concerned with her sense of priorities 
and her failure as a white woman and mother. In other words, her failure, in many ways, 
came not (only) from her inability to appropriately raise and care for a child, but in her 
scandalous escapades, her cunning tactics, and her beyond-life attitude, which appeared 
unbecoming for someone of her race and gender. The white trashed body remains “without 
[its] social graces”; it is figuratively and symbolically just “too loud” (Byers, 2009, p. 42–
43). Casey’s failure to meet the requirements of white femininity tells us that she was 
deviant and uncouth, her behaviour was unbridled, her morals were misplaced, and her 
body was expendable; disposable – literally, like trash.  
Defence Narrative 
Through a discourse of hegemonic hetero-femininity, the defence feminised Casey by 
emphasising her child-likeness and naïvety in a very explicit way: Casey was described as a 
"tiny, attractive, hip-looking girl with short dark hair and greenish-gray eyes in her early 
twenties … no more than five feet tall, weighed 105 pounds soaking wet, and looked totally 
out of place in the jail. She wasn’t your typical inmate” (Baez, 2012, p. 23, emphasis mine). 
Despite being in “jail blues,” Casey looked “very well kept” (p. 23). Identifiers, like the ones 
used by Baez, “both the words and their visual display” such as: “tiny,” “attractive,” 





and accentuate Casey’s victim-status as these characteristics simultaneously construct the 
“victim” in victim narratives (Byers, 2009, p. 35). Since historically white women have been 
positioned as the gentler sex, white women who conform to a stereotypical set of feminine 
characteristics are treated with more compassion than those who are “rougher around the 
edges, more street-wise  ... [and] much more hardened” – women who are ultimately 
perceived as unabashed and un-feminine (p. 23). Due to the position of Caylee’s body, Baez 
proclaimed that “the person … had to be pretty strong to lift it up … Did anyone think 105-
pound Casey had the strength to be able to do that?” (p. 155). For a fragile, feminine body 
like Casey’s, it was virtually impossible, as the defence argued, for the interference of 
Caylee’s body to have been achieved by Casey. We “still have a somewhat unchanged 
societal viewpoint towards women” as physically weak so that these women are thought to 
be incapable of such “horrendous brutality” (as cited in Walker & Filia, 2011, p. 519). 
Consequently women are less often constructed as, or suspected of being, the perpetrator 
in (the) murder (of their own children), and more likely to be the victims in crime stories. 
 “Feminine” women, Bartky (1997) writes, are “small and narrow … [who] appear 
tense and take up little space” (p. 30). In an attempt to alleviate Casey’s image as a criminal, 
the prosecution observed (and reported) that “the defense counsel had lowered Casey’s 
adjustable chair more than what was normal for a person of Casey’s height. Only her head 
and shoulders were visible above the table making her appear smaller and meeker than she 
was” (Ashton, 2012, p. 250). This illustrates the stereotype of hegemonic white femininity 
that defence counsel relied on to portray Casey as a good and innocent white woman, as 
her physical appearance was enhanced to emphasise her helplessness – which intersects 





Casey as “tiny,” “attractive,” “five-feet tall,” and “105 pounds,” the defendant was not only 
“gentled” but gendered and firmly located within familiar and “finer” discourses (and 
obsessions) of white womanhood in North American culture. This highly raced perspective 
of women as the gentler sex eclipses white women’s criminality and hinges on the notion 
that such women are innately non-aggressive, non-threatening, and therefore non-criminal. 
Expanding on that, these descriptions contribute to key aspects of hegemonic femininity so 
that we understand from the defence, women who, like Casey, conform to a collection of 
conventional feminine/female characteristics can only be perceived as “finer,” non-violent 
(i.e., harmless), and more deserving (of compassion). These stereotypes of white women 
have long persisted; they have been “interpreted, understood, and reinscribed within 
larger social and historical narratives that have a long history in [United States] society” 
(Dill & Zambrana, 2009b, p. 10). 
In discourses on white femininity, white women’s bodies are much more confined 
and their behaviours remain more polished than that of their racialised female 
counterparts. According to Baez, during the trial, Casey “would get angry and would 
become more and more animated … she’d make facial expressions, and I would constantly 
be on her about [that] … I want you to sit there and not react to the evidence … ‘People 
don’t like it,’ I would tell her. ‘They’re watching you.’ … ‘You need to stop that shit’” (p. 312–
13). The idea behind a legal system that protects victims tends to favour white women who 
are feminised and fragiled (Belknap, 2007, p. 152). The defence’s legal and social strategies 
helped to retain Casey’s white feminine virtues and to convince the jury of her innocence – 






The Sanctity of White Femininity  
Through defence counsel, we come to understand Casey as a white woman who possessed 
those characteristics inherent in “normal” feminine subjectivity. The implication of those 
identifiers, used by defence counsel to promote an image of Casey as ultra-feminine and 
innocent, compose the normalising discourses of femininity and power that white women 
are expected to uphold. Byers (2010a) argues that the public identifies with the image of 
young, white masculinity or femininity and slim and attractive bodies (p. 43). Feminine 
girls are “regular girls” who remind us which types of gendered identities “fit” and which 
do not (Byers, 2010a, p. 39). Casey, represented by counsel, was one of “those girls”: an 
attractive, able, heterosexed body.  
 As we recognise from the prosecutorial narrative, discursive constructions of 
femininity, for the most part, centre on (particular parts of) the body and the 
characteristics they maintain. Through defence counsel’s construction, a petite feminine 
body is not strong; it is fragile, weak in comparison to bigger bodies, especially compared 
to men and black women, who tend to be built bigger and have a different body style and 
texture. That Baez made an effort to reiterate Casey’s height and weight spells out quite 
intelligibly that being petite, thin, inexperienced, and even childlike/youthful is central to 
white supremacy. This construction of Casey positions her as “soft,” incompetent and 
without agency, like a pubescent child (in a word: innocent), a young girl with whom jurors 
might feel compelled to express sympathy. In fact, it was precisely for this reason that 
defence counsel preferred to have a jury comprised of all males “over the age of forty-five, 
closer to fifty and sixty [so] they would look at Casey as a young girl, and they’d have 





and support (Baez, 2013, p. 283, emphasis mine). The preference for male jurors was not 
unintentional; indeed, Baez stated that “if we were going to get a parent with small 
children, it should be a male” (p. 291). This hegemonic construction of Casey’s youth and 
femininity positions her, a “young girl,” as the fairer and gentler sex within systems of 
patriarchy so that the individual who appeared before the jury seemed worthy of mercy 
and sympathy. 
The ideal white, feminine body is delicate; yet indirectly it must also be desirable 
and exhibit subtle appeal and eroticism so that adult men feel inclined to take notice and 
want to protect. We see a clear example of this in the jail when Baez hugged Casey; when he 
was cautioned heavily against doing so by a female guard, he coldly replied: “she’s a human 
being, and if I want to … hug her, I will” (p. 59). This illustrates Casey’s humanness and her 
white femininity – she is a white woman worthy of love and affection. In another reported 
incident by Baez, “Casey had her hair up in a little ponytail. It had grown while she was in 
jail. When she was arrested, she had a short bob” (p. 73). Describing Casey’s hair style in 
this way validates her beauty and attractiveness, and therefore her white feminine traits. 
Everything considered, being an attractive and desirable white woman means that one is 
not (or could not be) a murderer. So while we see that whiteness granted Casey an 
overwhelming amount of privilege, gendered (and sexualised)-whiteness worked to 
magnify that privilege exponentially.  
 
Protecting the Virtues of White, Innocent Womanhood 
To put a finer point on the concept of womanhood, with the help of Bartky (1997), I assert 





of herself as female and … to her sense of herself as an existing individual” (p. 39). In a 
heavily masculine arena such as the law, women may often perceive themselves as inferior 
and weaker "especially … someone ‘young’ like Casey,” Baez explained. However, he 
argued: “I needed her to trust me, and to do that I needed to demonstrate that I was on her 
side, that I was going to do whatever I could under the law to help her through this 
process” (p. 25). Casey’s victimisation was emphasised by her loneliness: “Casey knew a lot 
of people … [however] she wasn’t close to one of them” (p. 171). Defence counsel 
challenged the prosecutorial narrative of the manipulative murderer by offering a narrative 
about a tender, naïve victim, a young woman who remained “unbelievably loyal … for a girl 
who never had anyone show her any loyalty, she was incredibly loyal” (p. 173). However, 
despite this loyalty, it was evident that the prosecution wanted to “kill the most hated 
woman in America … they would destroy her – and me – to win this case if they could” (p. 
190, emphasis in original).  
As public hatred for Casey intensified prior to and during her trial, maintaining her 
“innocence” on her own might have seemed like an unrealistic endeavour – until Baez 
“rescued” her. He was willing to confront the injustices she was facing and battle the 
system for her, particularly since “her very own family was throwing her to the wolves” (p. 
171). The prosecution’s narrative was “based on the impermissible evidence of Casey’s 
supposed lack of remorse that [they] kept jamming down the throat of the jury” (p. 322). 
According to Baez, the prosecution had “put on a case solely dealing with the bad character 
of Casey, or the attempted character assassination of her past conducts, boyfriends, people 





From the outset, the police and prosecutorial team were convinced that Casey had 
murdered her daughter, placed her body in the trunk of her car, and disposed of the body. 
Because of that, “they had a well-orchestrated plan” to ensure a conviction for Casey in the 
first-degree, “no matter what facts or evidence got in the way of their version of reality” 
(Baez, 2013, p. 54). The circus continued and intensified throughout the case, so when 
Casey was first released from jail after having her bond paid, it came as no surprise when 
one protestor instructed her to “burn in hell, bitch,” while another stated: “I hope you die!” 
(p. 74). These examples contribute to the cultural discourses that showcase a white female 
victim in constant need of security; therefore, Casey became a familiar figure with whom 
mainstream Americans could sympathise and identify. Like most white women, she needed 
a man to define and protect her. Baez emphasises his role as Casey’s hero by 
acknowledging “how much I had sacrificed for Casey … and how it took something away 
that I may never be able to get back, including my life savings, my home, and nearly my 
practice” (p. 405). His rescuing efforts also implicitly underline Casey’s vulnerable white 
femininity in contrast to Baez’s own (masculine) position, as well as the police and the 
prosecution. 
That Casey was a white woman in a grossly white, male-dominated space might 
have compelled Baez to protect her, seeing as “she didn’t have a soul in the world that was 
there for her … early on, after seeing she was fighting this world all alone, I decided I would 
be there for her … I’m not going to abandon her, no matter what” (p. 171–72, emphasis in 
original). A fallen white woman in need of rescuing, Casey literally required “defending” 
“from the shadow of the death penalty” which was described as “a huge and awesome 





difficult to persist in the fight, as it was impeding on Baez’s personal life and professional 
practice (Baez, 2013). Defending Casey (i.e., securing and flying in forensic experts from 
across the world, travelling across the world to meet experts, and building a defence) 
became incredibly taxing. Though Baez was unable to pay his mortgage and his home went 
into foreclosure, he persistently assured Casey that he would not abandon her “not for a 
second … I will try this case out of a cardboard box before I quit,” thereby underpinning the 
discourse of a protected and virtuous white femininity (Baez, 2013, p. 233, emphasis in 
original).  
 Defence counsel’s narrative relied on stereotypical character traits of the “common” 
woman: naïveté, immaturity, and in many cases, “insanity.” Even to the prosecution, Baez’s: 
attempt to address [those stereotypical perceptions] included what was perhaps 
his most amusing linguistic flourish, rebranding Casey's lies as 'fantasies' … her lies 
somehow did not carry the sinister nature that the word 'lie' implied. Instead, these 
were Casey’s fantasies; a playful, almost innocent way of describing the delusions 
that justified Casey’s repeated attempts at deception. (Ashton, 2012, p. 306) 
 
Casey was characterised as being unable to trust others rather than simply choosing not to 
trust others. During Casey and Baez’s initial encounters, Baez (2013) could not help 
thinking: “What are the secrets she is hiding?” (p. 24, emphasis in original). “This is a person 
with some serious trust issues,” Baez remarked, “she didn’t trust people for a reason” (p. 
25). The theory that was forwarded by defence counsel indicated that Casey was ill-
adjusted to her life, and especially to life at home, where she often had to lie and keep 
secrets in order to seek out normalcy. Casey, they argued, compartmentalised different 
aspects of her life and acted as though everything was right and proper. Ever since Casey 





defence counsel to argue that “this poor girl desperately needs some professional help” 
(Baez, 2013, p. 47).  
 Defence counsel attacked claims that Casey was deceitful and sinister, and replaced 
them with the portrait of a young woman who grew up being sexually abused in a 
dysfunctional household, isolated and terrified; having learned to lie about what her father 
was doing to her, "she was masking her web of deep, dark secrets that she was too afraid to 
reveal [she] seemed to be able to keep secrets" (p. 85). As Baez explained, "[the 
prosecution] had no idea why she was lying, and quite frankly, it seemed to me that they 
really didn't care" (p. 85). On the Anthonys’ computer, there were “a slew of searches on 
topics like self-defence for women and how to use household items as weapons for self-
defence … indicating someone who didn't feel safe at home”; Baez questioned: “why is she 
so afraid of being home? Why does she feel safe in jail?” (p. 162). Casey, it was reported, 
was frightened to be in the home alone with her father and was equally afraid to leave 
Caylee alone with only her father. For the past few years she had spoken about Zanny, a 
woman who most certainly never existed, and she had told her family she was going to 
work at a job she never had “like clockwork, for two years, five days a week … and not a 
soul noticed. Clearly she was masking her web of deep, dark secrets that she was too afraid 
to reveal” (p. 85).  
As discussed above, the prosecution exploited Casey’s sex life as a focus of interest 
and inquiry. According to Baez, they “paraded witness after witness to the stand to talk 
about [her] spending the night with men, her sexual partners” to showcase her sexually-
deviant ways (p. 229). The prosecutors asked her former boyfriends: “what was she like in 





was she warm and cuddly?” and made their testimonies public (p. 229). The boyfriends 
were further asked: “did you wear a condom? Did she tell you she had any diseases?” 
Though these questions were quite damaging, in actuality, "the incest would … explain so 
much of her behaviour and her promiscuity” (Baez, 2013, p. 167). Baez goes on to explain: 
Casey … was embarrassed. What girl was ever comfortable talking about having sex 
with her father? … slowly she would tell me more and more, how it first started 
with inappropriate touching when she was eight years old, he touched me, and then 
it went a little bit further than touching … he made her touch his penis, and then he 
made her jerk him off … Casey’s father started having intercourse with her, three 
and four times a week, until she was twelve. (p. 164) 
 
The defence challenged the prosecution’s theory that Casey’s behaviour hinted at her 
scandalous, promiscuous, and brazen attitude. For defence counsel, “like most victims of 
sexual abuse, Casey didn’t know the sexual boundaries with men  ... it was all about sex … 
the relationships were superficial … when she spoke of them, she didn’t speak highly of 
them. It’s as if they all reminded her of her father” (p. 167). The prosecution presented “two 
weeks of testimony that was completely irrelevant”; however, the defence argued that it 
“served only one purpose … to paint Casey as a slut, as a party girl, as a girl who lies, and 
that had absolutely nothing to do with how Caylee died” (Baez, 2013, p. 392). Herein lies a 
two-pronged defence: Casey is a nice, trusting, white woman, and because of this we should 
also see her as a victim (especially) within her family. We all (i.e., her father, friends, the 
police) failed her – not the other way around. 
 
Casey Anthony as a Good, White Mother 
The first line of counsel’s legal defence argued that Casey was a good mother: in a “unique 





sincerity was displayed when Casey said, ‘I don’t know where she is’” (p. 34). While the 
prosecution claimed that Caylee was neglected, the defence attempted to convince the jury 
that Casey’s maternal skills were impeccable. Defence counsel argued, along with outside 
witnesses, that Caylee never went without food, clothes, or shelter; she also never suffered 
from broken bones, diaper rashes, and the like (p. 264–65). In cases of real child abuse or 
neglect, “you almost always see a progression of abuse. You see a bruise, a black eye or a 
visit to the hospital with a broken arm. The child will be malnourished … there are always 
numerous documented incidents as the abuse progresses, until the actual death of the 
child” (Baez, 2013, p. 265). This was not the case with Casey and her daughter. According to 
Dr. Danzinger, a psychiatrist called as an expert witness by the defence, “Casey does not fit, 
in my opinion, into any of the categories of maternal filicide. The history is not consistent 
with an altruistic or mercy killing, a mentally ill or psychotic mother, the accidental death 
of a batterer child, spousal revenge, or an unwanted child” (as cited in Baez, 2013, p. 236). 
Solidifying this point, defence counsel argued that “I can’t tell you how many people 
testified about what a wonderful mother Casey was”; this “not only bolstered the accident 
theory but also counterbalanced all the outrageous behaviour Casey was accused of 
exhibiting” (p. 265). Casey’s love for her daughter was one of the “strongest and biggest” 
pieces of evidence counsel argued before the jury (p. 264).  
 Casey’s bedroom was reportedly a shrine to Caylee: “the room oozed of her love for 
her daughter” (p. 177). These testimonies lent integrity to counsel’s defence: “a person just 
doesn’t all of a sudden wake up one day and think, I’m going to kill my child, whom I loved 
and doted upon for the last three years. People just don’t do that. Where there’s abuse, 





nothing like that in this case” (p. 38, emphasis in original). Casey devoted her time and 
energies to her daughter’s welfare; “she was never the partier the prosecution contended 
she was.” In fact, according to the defence, Casey’s tattoo inscribing Bella Vita was truly “a 
tribute to Caylee” (p. 245). Dr. William Weitz, a psychiatrist who met with Casey to take her 
deposition, stated that “Casey showed ‘absolutely no motivation to want to do that in any 
personality, behavioural, or emotive capacity … if she did kill her child … then I almost 
would be tempted to think of some psychotic reaction. Because I can find and see no 
motive, no baseline for why’” (as cited in Baez, 2013, p. 244). These claims were 
substantiated by stories of Casey being very protective of her daughter; she bought 
protective locks for the doors and showered and slept with Caylee so that she was always 
free from danger or harm. These actions supported the idea that she was a good white 
woman and mother who subscribed to the ideological norms of white femininity and 
maternity and, therefore, could never harm her child. 
 The discourse of femininity in this case is almost exclusively defined and designed 
around gendered characteristics and the feminine body: what it does and what it tells us. 
The power imbued within patriarchal constructions of Casey’s femaleness while she stood 
accused for murder illustrates the power of white femininity in constituting subjectivity 
and, more precisely, universal notions of white womanhood, especially from a hegemonic 
patriarchal, sexist, and oppressive viewpoint.  
Conclusion 
Interlocking systems of privilege help to construct notions of white femininity so that the 
familiar woman in such discourse is a raced construct. In this interlocking of hegemonic 





body still represents vulnerability. This scenario (re)defines the norm of white womanhood 
and is consistent with how white women are viewed in the judiciary courts. The ways in 
which Casey Anthony’s alleged criminality was attributed to her “lesser than” subjectivity 
challenges discourses on maternity, sexuality, and whiteness. The prosecution framed their 
arguments as rebuttals to conservative, essentialist assessments of white women as the 
gentler sex incapable of malice and crime. Nevertheless, with the not-guilty verdict, we see 
that racist and sexist hegemony ultimately reaffirmed that the white, female body 




[8] Conclusion: The Un-criminalisation of White Womanhood  
Introduction 
The Anthony case has broader implications, as it exposes the interactions of racisms and 
sexisms within a legal framework that can never divorce itself from these “biases,” or from 
a history of white supremacy and colonialism. That whiteness is central to feminist 
discourse is a demonstration of white supremacy and has allowed me to complicate 
whiteness for analytical consideration.  
I used Florida v. Anthony to centralise whiteness, by positioning it as an axis of 
power and using it to think through differently-constructed narratives. This re-positioning 
ultimately expands a discussion of competing discourses of whiteness and femaleness. 
Whiteness and femaleness both acted in this research as an interlocking, coercive 
arrangement of power and privilege. In other words, by engaging in an analysis of white 
supremacy and white femininity, I examined Casey Anthony’s identity, as both white and 
female, as “technologies of power” that situate her within a field of privilege (Tomlinson, 
2013, p. 994). These “technologies of power” worked to tell an uncanny story: who the 
defendant is and how the reinforcement of her raced and gendered identity became just as 
(or more) significant to this research than the crime she was alleged to have committed. 
According to the legal narratives that opposing counsels used to construct Casey Anthony, 
she undoubtedly embodied a position of privilege, while simultaneously representing the 
potential loss or failure of such privilege. Through the narration of this white, female body 
as both privileged and failed, I unearthed the complexities of whiteness and femininity in 





 In my work, I looked at the powerful ways in which whiteness provides a method of 
“constructing” and “seeing,” and also explored how the construct of white femininity, used 
to advance notions of a perceived “innocence,” supports white supremacy. I further 
examined not only the different ways that the white identity can remain within – and be 
removed from – whiteness, but also how particular gendered articulations are bound up in 
white subject identities. Each construction offered by the lawyers gave voice to multiple, 
nuanced images of white femininity, thereby allowing me to elaborate on discourses based 
on those same nuanced constructs.  
Main Findings and Implications: An Interconnected Web of Power and Privilege 
Throughout this research, I identified how the defendant’s alleged criminality was 
constructed and discoursed, arguing that hegemonic narratives of whiteness and white 
femininity are central to strategies that maintain systems of privilege. Individuals are 
victimised each day by occupying the raced space of whiteness and the gendered space of 
femaleness; it is within this intersection that we witness Casey Anthony’s story and 
understand how multiple particles of identity work in concert to constantly revisit racist 
and sexist ideologies that perpetuate the notion of white supremacy and permit privileging 
within a legal context. Understanding how racism and sexism interlock is crucial to 
studying how this meshing contributes to “reconciling” white women’s criminality (Dirks et 
al., 2015). And, because white women are “unmarked,” their alleged criminality is difficult 
to fathom or conceptualise. 
The narrative of the prosecution strategically referenced race and was meant to 
counter references to a refined white femininity. Using Levine-Rasky’s (2002) expression 





such as “different,” “murderer,” “liar,” and “selfish” were only few of the words used as 
racist rhetoric and employed to challenge Casey Anthony’s merit and white status. An 
intense resistance to the term “white” was made vivid in the prosecution’s construction of 
the defendant so as to destabilise her white female victim-status and remove her from a 
place of whiteness – “punishment” for transgressing racist and sexist “codes of conduct.” 
Understanding the prosecution’s narrative reveals how gender and sexuality reinforced 
conservative, bourgeois ideals of what it means to be and act “white” – and thus, what it 
means to be a victim. This seemingly “white” “woman” did not fit the mould of the ideal 
victim who is always white and always female, for the movements of Casey Anthony’s body, 
her mode of speech, and her lack of scruples contradicted this characterisation and 
“marked” her as not fully white and female. Despite this alleged “marking,” the aim to 
dismantle Casey Anthony’s white privilege did not make exercising white supremacy futile. 
In other words, because whiteness is salvageable in a way that black, Asian, Indigenous, or 
Hispanic ethnicity are not, the defendant was able to rely on white supremacy to advance 
her claims of innocence; for that reason, she was never close to embodying a position of 
white inferiority. This depiction of white privilege allows us to appreciate the undisputed 
advantage in being white that any attempt to question or oppose it will probably be 
unsuccessful, especially given the multiple ways and the many individuals who were 
employed to whiten Casey Anthony as a means of emphasising sameness and innocence. As 
such, Casey Anthony was not/never abstracted from a history of racial privilege (in the 
legal system). 
The defence’s narrative teaches us how whiteness can be rescued, “defended” and 





defence construed race and gender in both subtle and not-so-subtle ways by emphasising 
stereotypes, and reinforcing the historical cultural superiority of white females. Casey 
Anthony’s narrative, as told by defence counsel, is rooted in notions of “victimhood as 
something only truly and tragically experienced by white women” (Kilty & Fabian, 2010, p. 
133). The racist and sexist discourse that elevates and empowers such women solidifies 
social knowledge as normalised and historicised in the fabric of United States society. I 
surmise that alleged criminals who do not fit the image of a white, conventionally attractive 
female cannot be so easily relatable and sympathised and will not enjoy the same level of 
“whitening” and protection that Casey Anthony’s beauty, femininity, and whiteness 
permitted. 
Both of Casey Anthony’s subject positions – criminal (inferior white) and victim 
(privileged white) – were highly contested throughout the trial, and the reproductions and 
negotiations that were made about Casey Anthony can be understood within brackets of 
whiteness and femaleness. Much of the evidence illustrates that Casey Anthony’s claims to 
whiteness (and as a result, her white femininity and maternity) was strengthened in the 
courtroom by her daughter’s and parent’s own claims to that racial category, making Casey 
Anthony’s behaviours particularly difficult to condemn. We certainly cannot discount the 
role that whiteness by all “actors” played in the protection of Casey Anthony. The identity 
of the Anthonys played a large role in how the case was shaped; their white identities were 
constantly intersecting and collaboratively working together from all avenues. Being white 
and female bestowed onto Casey Anthony a number of privileges that she was able to rely 
on, and afforded her with an undeniable advantage to escape many kinds of penalties or 





Similar to the conclusions drawn by Dirks et al. (2015), I have also argued that 
white women’s criminality is “generally protected, neutralized, trivialized, and excused” (p. 
170) – especially when these women have access to sites of whiteness that confer privilege. 
Seeing that the “protection” that was afforded to Casey Anthony was highly raced, I 
considered how discourses and dominant ideologies of femininity combined to provide a 
more complex sense of the multidimensional nature of power and privilege for Casey 
Anthony. Her experience mirrors the everyday narrative, translated into familiar discourse 
about identity, victimhood, and their interconnectedness (Madriz, 1997, p. 343). The 
element of privilege within the realm of criminality makes it particularly impossible to 
view white women who support hegemonic discourses of femininity as criminal. It was the 
over-dependency of the victim discourse/narrative of the white woman that meant Casey 
Anthony was not to be subjected or held up to a degree of criminalisation despite intense 
public support for her conviction. The visibility of Casey Anthony’s white, female body told 
us exactly who she was. Her skin clearly marked (or is it unmarked?) her as a white 
privileged woman. 
Whiteness was mobilised in cultural, societal, and systematic (or institutional) form 
throughout this case: both counsels’ engagements with each other and Casey Anthony’s 
story, their construction of Caylee as a vulnerable, dead, white, little girl, the parents who 
“whitened” their daughter, the white media’s response to the crime and portraits of Caylee 
as a white victim who also helped to “whiten” her mother, the support and funding that was 
given to the Anthonys thereby making them credible white people, and the experts that 
were involved in the case to help secure a plausible defence and maintain Casey Anthony’s 





the dominant side of the white power structure. The mobilisation of whiteness as both 
rhetoric and legal strategy proved incredibly effective for the defence. Casey Anthony’s 
acquittal was not an aberration of the American legal system, regardless of intense public 
opinion, outrage, and protest; the verdict was the result of a system that knew how to “do 
the morally right thing” for the “white …” I mean, “right type of person.” It is, however, 
crucial to remember that “as unsatisfying as this may be … that doesn’t mean the system is 
broken … this is how the system works” (Ashton, 2012, p. 321-22). 
Formulating an Explanation: The “Not-Guilty” Verdict and “Reason-ability” 
My research uses an interlocking approach and illuminates that white supremacy operates 
to excuse or justify the criminal behaviors and actions of certain white people “privileged” 
by gender, beauty, and whiteness (Dirks et al., 2015). Furthermore, my research cements 
the ways whiteness is seen and lived as an identity “that negative attributions cannot 
destabilise” (McIntosh, 1998, p. 210). By demonstrating how discourses invade the body, 
and how aspects of white identity are inextricably linked with gender, I knew the racial 
dialogue with my grandmother, mother, and Aqiyla about a white woman standing trial for 
murder would be substantial in my endeavour to deepen our understanding of the way 
bodies are (un)criminalised from particular identity standpoints. 
 Depicted from a critical socio-legal lens, the Casey Anthony story is a prime 
example of the reality of how the social significance of race at the intersection of gender, 
and the system of justice (i.e., the court of law) that is affected by it, are relational to how 
whiteness can effectively “reconstitute itself and rebuild its defences” in the process (Fiske, 
1996, p. 41). This case illuminates the power of race and the ways in which one defendant’s 





are to understand ourselves and our society in part through Casey Anthony’s story and 
through our connection to her as a white person who accessed “whiteness” from different 
vantage points, then surely we need to assess and critique the verdict. For not doing so 
would be to support racial dominance (i.e., white hegemony) and the values of white 
privilege inherent and persistent in our legal and social systems.  
 More broadly, my findings demonstrate another way that white protection and 
gender privilege operate in the courtroom. The court of law emphasises being 
“reasonable”: behaviours of a reasonable person – standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.20 As Ashton (2012) contends, “reasonable doubt is not a speculative, imaginary, or 
forced doubt”; rather, it only works by jurors applying common sense, “that knowledge of 
how people act by having lived in the world, to reach their own conclusion” (p. 319). 
Indeed, reasonability in the court of law is having the “ability to reason” rationally and hold 
everyone accountable to the same “reasonable” standard of behaviour under the same or 
similar circumstances. Still, this notion of “reasonability” is often horribly difficult to 
conceptualise, despite seeing that justice ought to be done in a manner that fits the 
“reasonable person.” From a feminist standpoint, Jiwani (2002) explains that the law’s 
conception of the “reasonable person” is one who is universally seen and constructed from 
a white, male, middle-class perspective (p. 77). I support Jiwani’s argument by addressing 
how claims of reasonability support systems of white superiority, patriarchy, and classism 
by intersecting with “normative standards … around the notion of an ideal typical 
[American] who is always seen as white or the notion of a reasonable person defined in 
                                                             
20 A reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant “may arise from the evidence, conflict in the evidence or lack of evidence” 
(Walker & Filia, 2011, p. 501). If there is reasonable doubt, the jury should find the defendant not guilty. If the jury has no 





terms of race, class privilege, and hetero-normativity” (Jiwani, 2006, p. 88). To interrogate 
notions of hegemonic femininity, I argue that in the court of law, male and female 
defendants, fathers and mothers specifically, are seen and treated differently in cases 
involving infanticide or filicide, perhaps even murder. We do not want to, or we choose not 
to, look at how white women/mothers could possibly be implicated in criminal activity – 
which once again highlights the positions of dominance that white women hold.  
Because white women do not generate public anxieties and are, by and large, agents 
of moral uplift and order or, what Mohanram (1999) calls, “keepers of the imperial hearth 
... part of the colonial project and … potential settlers” sympathy is extended, more often 
and openly, towards mothers than towards fathers so that the primary social subject – in 
these cases, the “reasonable person” – shifts towards the white female (p. 167). Madriz 
(1997) cements Mohanram’s argument by stating that the “image of white women as 
victims is closely related to the ideal of ‘white womanhood’ and the need to preserve it” (p. 
350). Because of the un-nameable criminality of white, “feminine” women, I assert that the 
female role is more privileged than the male role. When applied to women, the “victim” 
label is affixed rather quickly and securely, and carries with it more considerate reactions. 
This is a crucial component in understanding the discursive workings of criminal justice as 
it applies to what we (think we) know about a group that holds a secure place of privilege 
and considerable power; in a sense, they hold the most power in a criminal and legal setting 
– more powerful than racialised women, less conventionally “feminine” (i.e., unattractive) 
women, and even their white, male (middle-class) counterparts. These women help 
reproduce and maintain the white, hetero-normative, nation-state, thereby making the 





Despite the prosecution’s attempts to “trash” Casey Anthony so that she would be 
unable to access white privilege, their efforts did not result in a conviction – the status quo 
remained firmly in place. My basic contention is that Casey Anthony’s innocence is, in part, 
what it means to be a privileged white woman in the United States of America under the 
artifice of white supremacy – and remains integral to the framework through which this 
case could be truly heard and understood. Alas, I am compelled to philosophise that Casey 
Anthony “beat the system” and escaped the white American imagination as a(n) (alleged) 
murderer; this might never have happened had she been a racialised woman. Now, it might 
be said that, similar to Monica Lewinski’s evident trashiness, Casey Anthony’s debased 
whiteness was clearly legible, if only the jury was willing to accept the clues. It seems 
apparent, however, that Casey Anthony was able to redeem her white status – being able to 
access just enough whiteness for the jury to find her not-guilty.  
Future Research 
This thesis touched on a number of concepts and theories that could be pursued with 
further research. For example, a comparative study would be quite useful for revealing 
common descriptions and formations of defendants of the same or different raced and 
gendered (and classed) backgrounds to better understand how they are framed by legal 
counsels. In addition, given the extensive, high-profile nature of this story, a critical 
analysis of the media attention of the Anthony case would be revealing, particularly to 
examine how (and to what effect) the media was able to construct (the whiteness of) Casey 
Anthony within news discourse. Alternatively, scholars might offer theories about how 
differently constructed narratives may have changed the way the case was handled and 





story (with somewhat “different” characters) could incite alternate views about the alleged 




 [9] Postscript: Researcher Situatedness 
Due to the love and support rendered by my mother and father, who have continuously 
encouraged me to speak and write intelligently and provocatively, I have come to proudly 
and proficiently situate myself in my academics.  
 For me, at least, race is an extremely complex concept, or as Frankenberg (1993) 
refers to it: “dynamic, transformable, [and] lived” (p. 191). Certainly, the concept of 
discrimination based on race is something that has to be lived and experienced to be truly 
understood. After attending a multi-racial elementary school in my home city of Montréal, 
Québec, with children from all cultural and social backgrounds, I was “introduced” to (and 
made aware of) the notion of my “blackness” while attending a white private high school. 
The student body was comprised largely of white children from middle to upper-income 
families: children who did not, in the very least, look anything like me. Despite growing up 
in Montréal, an increasingly racially diverse and very multifaceted city (be it by religious 
faith, social status, cultural upbringing, ethnic background, and so forth), it was not easily 
conceivable by my non-white friends for a black child to attend a “white school,” and in 
many cases I was often described as becoming too white or “bougie.” While this label could 
be conceived as “positive,” meaning one is of the privileged, upper classes, the intention to 
stigmatise and alienate me was negative and crippling. However, I always tried to maintain 
hope, and I was reassured by my parents who informed me that this would all ensure 
greater security and bring many future prospects into realisation. Sadly, in this society, that 
sort of advantage typically comes with being able to access certain resources and benefits 
customary to whites alone, and having the ability and mobility to operate successfully in 





 Being placed in a white landscape made me think that while my race, by default, 
positioned me out of the school’s whiteness, at the same time, I was being condemned and 
chastised within it by my very own peers. My desperate struggle to effect blackness (i.e., 
this sense of “acting black” that was always readily enforced and sustained through 
attitude, conduct, dress, and speech), while still trying to preserve the strict cultural values 
and standards of my “white” high school, proved to be quite challenging. My identity began 
to seem foreign to me; much like an artifice, something I felt I had to successfully achieve or 
do rather than simply be. And yet, amidst everything else, it appeared to be a constant 
performance that never seemed to be done quite right according to the standards of my 
intimate circle. This struggle manifested itself when I discussed the need to see a therapist 
with the boy I liked. The conversation led him to ask me in all seriousness: “are you white?” 
and before I could offer a ready, intelligible-enough, and well-crafted response, one that 
seemed sensible to even myself, he proceeded to interrogate me harshly and more loudly: 
“… but are YOU white?” 
 I noticed how incredibly difficult it was to underplay this white-washed image 
whereby I was abandoning much of who I was to identify with whiteness, while trying to 
display the characteristics with which blackness, alone, is commonly associated. Speaking 
and doing blackness, but acknowledging that this is still a world governed by white 
principles, I simultaneously tried to fit into these two distinct environments. Attempting to 
blur the strict division between these two worlds, I tried to conceptualise the matter and 
meaning of race, figuring out how to, in turn, appropriate a sense of whiteness in one place, 





 I imagine that as a second-generation Canadian from Afro- and Chinese-Trinidadian 
descendants, the conception of race or more precisely, blackness, should mean everything 
to me, owing to the generosity of white people who have constantly reminded me of such 
“fact.” As a graduate student pursing an advanced degree in criminology, I often felt that it 
would somehow be a responsibility of mine to produce scholarship and speak up against 
the many injustices and oppressions of those who are racialised within the North American 
context, especially from a criminal justice standpoint. But race-based inequality originates 
from white supremacy – “white created and white sustained and white perpetuated” as 
Juárez, (2013, p. 42) designates it. Therefore, in order to critically dissect the issues of 
criminality, I wished to attain a firm comprehension of white supremacy, thus equipping 
myself with the acumen to measure the scope of crime from the views of white society. 
Adequately critiquing whiteness required an invested discursive focus on the white 
majority to understand the insidious ways whiteness operates and maintains its 
dominance in a white world. I strongly believe that only with a well-informed 
understanding of the theoretical and empirical nature of whiteness would I be able to 
carefully assess and discuss whiteness at an attempt for greater consideration.  
 Perhaps endeavouring to join in on this important dialogue about whiteness strays 
from what would commonly be expected of me, meaning that as a racialised person I ought 
to gear my efforts solely towards the study and theorisation of blackness. However, I will 
not appease such an expectation or obligation. It is not to say that I am far too “bougie,” 
superior, or beyond the study of “my people,” but I will not accept any biased expectations 
generated about me, nor give anyone the privilege of reducing or ghettoising me. I also do 





Moreover, I felt that I ought not to overstep my bounds by generating talk about race in a 
respected, professional, regulated, and, yes, a historically white academy that continues to 
be rooted in the power structure that upholds this same system of racial domination that 
this work mentions. I often sensed that white people disliked acknowledging race speech, 
especially when oppressed people speak about white privilege and openly of their 
struggles, and this subsequently gave me the conviction that what I hope to communicate 
would be challenged or disregarded – especially since we live in what is often purported to 
be a colour-blind, post-racial society. Maybe. Possibly.  
 Despite this earlier reservation, I remained incredibly intrigued by the everyday 
expressions of whiteness and situations of white lives. From high school onwards I noticed 
that, historically, race and ethnicity, and white and black spaces or faces are telling 
indicators of societal considerations and expectations. My experiences and overall interest 
in the generalisation of behaviours based on race and, presumably, space, spurred my 
curiosity and inspired me to venture into this particular sector of criminology. I have, ever 
since, been fascinated and advantaged to step onto a platform, with the collaboration of my 
supervisory committee, where I can openly discuss race by accepting and embracing this 
discussion about whiteness and white supremacy to investigate, and, more importantly, to 
interrogate it.  
 Throughout this journey I realised that race and racial differences are ever-
prevalent and cannot be overlooked; we must accept the uncomfortable, yet undeniable, 
truth that racism is still pervasive and persistent (unveiled or not) and continues to work in 
the shaping and underpinning of many social institutions and structures. Indeed, it has 





vouch for or invest in my pursuit of discoursing the dynamism of race and research, who 
have helped me to appreciate all of this while advancing this work on a more meaningful 
scale. They have allowed me to fathom what the white race is in understanding not only 
race and colonialism, but also in how race gets articulated in relation to (almost) 
everything else. It is the intellect and passion of these scholars that gave me reasons to 
believe that this has to matter; we need “not pretend that it has never or ceased to matter,” 
according to Leroux (2010, p. 22), while bridging the gap between what the mainstream 
anticipates and what academia requires, and amending my own doubts about race 
relations so that I could benefit from their support and ensure the success of this research.  
 While I chose to evade writing a thesis directly reinforcing or attending to 
blackness by maintaining a sustained focus on white privilege in the area of the law, this is 
no way an attempt to obscure discussions of blackness nor minimise or dismiss the 
importance of study and articulations of the black experience in America. On the contrary, I 
could not have profoundly positioned whiteness as a primary lens and examined the way 
whiteness operates in the legal system without asserting and referencing, perhaps subtly, 
the way racialised subjects have traditionally been constructed and treated in American 
culture.  
 It was imperative that I locate myself within this study to articulate not only how 
race is lived, but also how it is especially contested or destabilised from different (a)venues. 
This stemmed from some of my earlier recollections in a different way, one in which the 
grand narrative surrounding race can be deconstructed and the raced identity can always 
be scrutinised. In the process, I was brought back to many memories during my upbringing 





opposition to my own racialisation. Consequently, I have considered the various ways that 
this narrative about race and whiteness addresses even my own insecurities about the 
expectations of race and how it invites me into different sorts of discussions and relations 
to untangle or dislodge, and, most certainly, to complicate whiteness.  
 Under the assumption that race is understood as a way of doing and achieving 
identity, I appreciate that one can enter into, and exit out of, blackness in the same fashion 
that one can dispute whiteness from particular social locales, so that whiteness, can, 
similarly, be “racialised” just as blackness can, in a way, be “whitened.” I have used this 
logic for a critical examination and representation of whiteness by temporarily positioning 
it outside of its privileged location and looking at the effects of that destabilisation and 
relocation, but also fully, and most importantly, acknowledging the ever-pervasive 
investment, sustained power, and property value inherently built into whiteness itself.  
 At the very end of all of this, I am delighted to see how my work situates itself 
within social conflicts and cultural trends that work to build knowledge within the areas of 
criminology and whiteness studies to help generate further dialogue and study. What a 
profound experience this endeavour has brought me; it was all worth doing and I could not 
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